ETHICS
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

LEADING CONTENTS

VARIATION ON A THEME BY COOLEY  By REXFORD TUGWELL

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PEACE: SOCIAL-SCIENCE CHIMERA?
By JESSIE BERNARD

DISCUSSION AND REVIEWS
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Cant an individual? he said, considering social science. Is the event this power known? individual, organism.

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1 In New York: Columbia
CHARLES HORTON COOLEY at about the beginning of the century observed that there was no significant distinction to be made between individuals and societies. "The real thing," he said, "is Human Life, which may be considered in an individual aspect or in a social." Cooley was intending to analyze the effects of society on the individual in this particular work. As he began he acknowledged the essential likenesses of the individual organism and the social organism of which it is part:

Society, or any complex group, may, to ordinary observation, be a very different thing from all of its members viewed one by one—as a man who beheld General Grant's army from Missionary Ridge would have seen something other than he would by approaching every soldier in it. ... There may, in all such cases, be a system or organization in the whole that is not apparent in the parts. In this sense, and in no other, is there a difference between society and the individuals of which it is composed; a difference not residing in the facts themselves but existing to the observer on account of the limits of his perception. A complete view of society would also be a complete view of all the individuals, and vice versa; there would be no difference between them.

The book to which these remarks were an introduction was not only devoted mostly to the effect on individual human nature of association with others—the development of hostility, sympathy, emulation, the social conscience and leadership—it was written from the background of a particular environment. This was the American Middle West with its still-lingering characteristics of the frontier which included a necessary independence and individualism: there was no other way to get along on the borderland of civilization than by a ruthless subduing of natural enemies and by competition. The Middle West was not, even then, the heavily settled country it was destined to be. Social discipline was not strict, and technology had not yet bound individuals together with its tight nets of communication and transport. Yet, even from Ann Arbor in Michigan, Cooley could see the essential unity and enduring likenesses of all living beings and their societies.

It has become much more obvious, as time has passed, that his observation was a penetrating one. By now it has become relevant everywhere; and, indeed, we can see now that it was always the rule and that the exceptions have been few. Even in the most primitive societies the individual and his group were more closely identified than they were during the

1 In Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902).
settling of the American continent. That period may, indeed, have been the prize exhibit of individualism in all history. And, of course, it changed so greatly as to be unrecognizable when settlement came and civilization developed. It is not strange, however, that the freedoms of that period should seem desirable to those whose memory may still run almost to the founding of its communities or even that the institutions inherited from that unique period should still seem favorable. The phrase for that backward look toward the good old days is "historic homesickness," and this is a disease which seems to affect intellectuals along with others. For intellectuals, no less than others, in spite of an occasional perceptive philosopher or an historian like Turner, did not for a long time realize the uniqueness of the nineteenth century in America. They permitted homesickness for a vanished environment rather than realistic observation to shape their conceptions of man and his relation to the world. The United States is the last stronghold of an individualism which expresses itself in an economics of laissez faire, a political theory of checks and balances, and a social theory of natural individual rights.

This is a situation which cannot endure, of course; conceptions which are irrelevant to contemporary realities will die and be replaced by more useful ones. Facts are more stubborn than theories. But, as we are seeing now, their death may be a long and lingering one. It may, indeed, in a period of extremely rapid change, be so protracted as to involve definite social dangers. It is unfortunate but true that most of the responsibility for this dangerous lag is attributable to universities, for it is there that individualism, laissez faire, and pluralistic political theories have their stronghold. The great contrast between the social and the physical sciences in this respect had its final exposure at Hiroshima. Today the old social science is as dated and inadequate as Newtonian physics. Not all its expositors have yet widened their conceptions, but those who have not slowly wither on the tree of learning.

II

In trying to understand the relation of men to one another in society it is useful to have considered previously the relations among simpler individuals and species who share with man the experience of life. Many zoologists and botanists have lately become ecologists rather than classifiers. They are, indeed, discovering that only as they study relationships can they really understand the phenomena of plant and animal as well as human life. The complex whole in which related things and individual functions have a significant life which conditions that of all its parts and members.

As a beginning, consider the situation referred to by such writers as Allee and Emerson, whose relevant conclusions I venture to paraphrase, with due apology, in nontechnical language. Their account would begin somewhat as follows:

The generalizations which emerge from studying ecological communities in the seas, the forests, the prairies, or the deserts reveal the existence of an interspecies biological integration. There is order everywhere; there is specialization; there is cooperation. The influences which bring about the established relationships are to be found both in the physical and in the biotic environments. There are quantitative gradients which establish threshold qualities. A life nowhere, where the climate is too hot, too cold, too wet, too dry, or too great a distance away from the sea and the wise might say the sun, etc.

This chart shows, among many others, the production process of wood, as compared to the genetic or Darwinian process, which is also shown here. Lake, early in his paper, follows with a similar, but mixed, social and mentalistic, success producing one more population of the mind, a socially conditioned one, of which he says, "It is our hope to mention and deal with this.

To complete the comparison, he earlier considered mutualism and parasitism in man, and the same for both animals and plants in the service of each other, variously modified, of course.
VARIATION ON A THEME BY COLEY

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A familiar example is that of a forest edge where there is more light than in the deep woods; where there are greater extremes of temperature than in the trees; where there is greater evaporation at the borders and likewise more movement of the air.

These are the conditions; the results are shown in quantitative differences among many species. These include the food plants, the plant-eaters among the animals, and the scavengers, predators, and parasites in the complex food web. There are found not only gradations indicating spatial organization but also temporal sequences. For instance, in the Lake Michigan dune country, poplars are an early tree; they are replaced by pines; pines are followed by oaks; and the climax is reached in a mixed beech-maple forest. In every environment similar sequences can be observed. This succession is evolved through the conditions produced at each stage which prepare for the next. For instance, the dropping leaves of the poplar cause an accumulation of humus in the soil which reduces evaporation and gradually eliminates the species adjusted to dry conditions and favors the survival of those which prefer more moisture. The early stages are not self-perpetuating; but the climax forest is one which is permanent along with all its dependent species.

This permanent community develops great complexity, it loses some of the resistance earlier communities had to severe natural conditions; it develops instead a system of mutual interdependence which causes the risks and resistances to be shared. Within these permanent complexes there are, among species, both conflict and co-operation—some merely tolerate each other, some live through reciprocal services. These relationships set up survival values which sort out a large number of genetic variables. Thus the whole community begins to move along another temporal dimension—that of organic evolution.

The biologists bring us, in this way, to the theoretical borderland between biotic change which operates through the olds of survival, and these in turn result in qualitative differences.

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The biologists bring us, in this way, to the theoretical borderland between biotic change which operates through the

life and death of individuals and species—the disappearance of the poplars from the dunes—and that which occurs through modifications in the germ plasm. There is thus only a blurred distinction between individual and social evolution. The individual may be selected to suit a social purpose so that those individuals who are the parents of future generations are better accommodated to the conditions of the life they must lead. There is thus set up an evolutionary process through individual life and death and the survival of the well adapted which has somewhat the same effect as the inheritance of acquired characters—the Lamarckism which caused so long a controversy among biologists.

Social evolution takes place, it seems, not only by accumulation and modification of the cultural mass but by biological adaptation to it, even if that adaptation does not occur as it was once believed that it must.

The social organism does not have a germ plasm; it does not have an individual life and death. It does, however, have an organization which not only is dimensional (spatial and temporal) but is modified in evolutionary processes. It even uses the germ plasms of its individual constituents for this purpose. It is very complex and has delicate established relationships which reveal themselves to careful and continued observation; and any change in the physical or biotic environments will set up a train of consequences which can be understood only by knowing the web of relationships which are thus disturbed, the influence of various conditions (as temperature, mois-


5 And which has been so strangely revived in our generation by Lysenko and his followers in the Soviet Union. See for a statement of the modern geneticists, the last chapter of the H. S. Jennings' The Biological Basis of Human Nature; see also R. B. Goldschmidt, "Research and Politics," Science, CIX (1949), 219 ff.
ture, rate of evaporation, etc.) on community life.

Even among the plants the relationships are extremely complex, especially when the influence of the biotic environment is considered; but, when the ecologists pass from plant to animal life, an even greater complexity is encountered. The same principles of adjustment hold; but there is a new factor. This is the development of teleological adjustment and the specialization of directive organs. Hitherto in the evolutionary advance only such factors as the web of life, the food chain, and the pyramid of numbers have been influential in integration. Only a gross and crude pressure has been used by nature. Since animals have self-conceived direction and organs for increased mobility, their power of movement and of quick accommodation is infinitely greater than that of plants. There appears an altogether new unity in the species and in the interspecies community. And, when man is studied, this becomes the apparently dominant motif in evolution. In society individuals are specialized and are specialized in their associations; these specialized groups are of mutual use and live together through necessity.6

III

The individual organism, of course, has gradually changed its character; and, through the processes of evolution, the higher species have gradually come into possession of a specialized directing apparatus. This appeared first as a faintly recognizable anterior area which for some reason had a higher metabolic rate and greater sensitivity.7 In the higher animals this area through the years became a brain, a thinking organ, specialized to co-ordinate the other organs and to give them common direction.

In this, as in other adaptations, there are great differences among the species and some differences among individuals within species. Not all animals are able to co-ordinate well. Allee notes, for instance, that the jellyfish is one of those animals which, although it has a recognizable mass, and is even radially symmetrical, has very little directive specialization. It has sensitive areas surrounding each of numerous jelly-like disks; and any one of these is able to originate impulses which set up the rhythmic pulsations by which the animal moves; it is, therefore, temporarily dominant. As the evolutionary scale is ascended, one region or end of the animal is more and more definitely specialized to become the anterior whose first function it is to meet and deal with new stimuli in the environment. This becomes the concentrating point for sense organs and nervous tissue; it is finally recognizable not only as the anterior but as the head. Here there develops a definitely higher metabolic rate; there is a center for communications and the interchange of impulses; and it is the region where leadership comes to reside and to provide direction for all the rest of the body.

It is impossible to read the biologists’ descriptions of this evolutionary development without thinking of the close analogy there must be with social evolution. And, indeed, Allee goes on to indicate how apt the analogy is.8 He uses a number of illustrations to show how definite localized leadership has come to be not


7 This is an area of biological controversy which is here avoided by the weasel phrase “for some reason,” but deliberately; it is not important for the present intention.

not only among the lower animals but among men. In a herd of cows, for instance, he describes how, if the bull is not present, the oldest cow is deferred to, with others falling into rank; and, of course, he analyzes the classic "peck order" among the hens of a flock. He even goes on to identify the same phenomenon as it was observed by him in the faculty meetings of a New England college:

As the head of the group in a large, high-backed chair, sat the president looking down the table to his dean seated in a chair not nearly so large and impressive. Around this table in order of seniority sat the professors in comfortable, even though low-backed, arm chairs. Back of them, again in order of seniority, sat the associate and assistant professors but in hard-bottomed Windsor chairs; while at the foot of the table in hard, uncomfortable "kitchen" chairs sat the instructors, who were supposed to be present but not to take part in the discussions unless asked to do so.9

Just at the end of this discussion Allee comes to his most significant observation. It is this: when primitive animals develop a specialized organization along a head-to-tail axis, the anterior end is dictatorial; that is to say, the subordinate parts have very little influence on the dominant region. But in the more developed mammals, notably in man, the brain has close and instantaneous back-and-forth connections with all the body's other parts; and there then develops something which closely resembles "physiological democracy as contrasted with the physiological autocracy of the more primitive animals with distinct heads." In the higher animals there is a most intricate and delicate development to facilitate democratic operations. All parts of the body are involved, including prominently the viscera, the endocrine glands acting through the blood stream, and the muscles. They determine not

only the physiological condition of the brain, and so the level of awareness and the health of nervous connections, but definitely suggest the necessary reactions. Allee is quite right: it is a democratic arrangement with provision for leadership and the maintenance of direction.

The analogy between this highly developed mammal and equally advanced social groups is even more striking than similar analogies at lower levels. There is a specialization of parts with well-developed mechanisms for communication—signs, language, and more and more effective means for their transmission. And, strikingly, as in the animal, when the development is very advanced, democracy is substituted for autocracy. All parts of the social organism are, so to speak, consulted; and decisions are reached co-operatively. It is with society, at this stage, as it is with the higher animals: the parts are so interlaced and interdependent that none can be said to be of greater importance than others. The whole is so closely held together by the nervous system and the blood stream that what affects any, affects all. Decisions, therefore, on all actions are of importance to all parts, and they are appropriately included in the processes of collective decision. Allee, contemplating this, comes to the point of saying directly that "the organization of the individual may be compared with that in the highly organized bird flocks, or in colonies of ants, or in the best human societies in which the reactions seem to be group-controlled rather than controlled by one individual."10

And he does not fail to note that social organizations in which laws rather than men rule are the ultimate in social development. There develops, even among bees, an élan or common

9 Ibid., p. 154.
10 Ibid., p. 159.
agreement which is called “the spirit of the hive”; and this instinctive agreement or common consent is substituted for the older and more primitive struggle for survival. Co-operation has now had its final triumph. Such competition as still exists is a kind of competition in good works which can result only in social benefit. And, of course, the highest organizations dispense even with leadership; “the individuals composing the group become entirely group-centered rather than individually minded. There is neither authority nor obedience, for neither is needed in the face of complete cooperation for the common good.”

IV

When protozoan life proved insufficient for nature’s purposes and metazoan organization began, what seems in many ways the most startling change in all evolution took place. It was comparable, in life-history, only to such events as the beginning of life itself, to the differentiation of the sexes, to the wonderful invention of individual death, and the subsequent development of social immortality. Animals in a way really ceased to be animals when multicellular aggregations appeared. They became small societies; and it often required cons of time for species and individuals to acquire such definite character and behavior as to be clearly identifiable. Some of them, as always happens in evolution, became arrested at or near the border line and can now be studied as nature’s failures—or perhaps her indifferences. For us, one of the interesting characteristics of the animal organizations surviving at that stage is the remarkable likeness between those early multicellular animals and the aggregations of animals—including human beings—which we have not ordinarily regarded as organic. The truth is, however, that the likeness are startling and the differences very few. And, of course, we can understand that this is because the same purpose is gained in both cases: there can be an indefinite enlargement of the organism upon which the blind influences of natural selection can act; and the individual—like the cell of the animal—merged in the larger organism, is not exposed to the immediate effects of selection. This protection allows the individual to vary and become differentiated—specialized—to a degree which would be fatal if he were not part of a whole. At the same time it allows a new kind of free and sometimes marvelous development for the whole organism because all the differentiated individuals working at their specialty, in harmony and sheltered as they are, may produced unprecedented and sometimes magnificent results. 

We may say that societies of individual animals were in strictly logical succession to societies of cells in the animal and that the same results were gained. This process produced the smoothly functioning societies of the bees, the ants, and many other animals without troublesome individual anterior developments. One of nature’s problems arose just here: how to transfer to the multicellular society the thinking apparatus which had become so highly developed in some multicellular animals. There are animals in which the mouth, the locomotor apparatus, and the sexual mechanisms still try to—and sometimes succeed in—thinking for themselves. This results in the kind of disorganization, conflict, and frustration which would be expected: sometimes, in some animals, it eventually involves partial or complete destruction. These, of course, are the arrested species which perhaps did not develop because they found themselves able to maintain a kind

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However, and the TS, we use the Cases:

One of the most important aspects of the animal kingdom is evolution, which is the result of the natural selection of the fittest species. Biological history is littered with these deceased species who may have lingered for some time or may have disappeared quite quickly.

Societies made up of individuals show the same characteristics. Some are evolving rapidly toward a more differentiated and complex life; some are apparently content to remain at an arrested stage. Those which are arrested at any stage risk the constant danger, of course, that the rigid environmental conditions they require may be changed. Their thresholds of tolerance are too easily crossed. The more primitive groups of human savages, for instance, since this is a finite globe, are apparently doomed. There is not enough space to give them the exploitable area they require, since the more developed groups require it, too, and in competition are very much stronger. And the analogy can be extended, if more subtle distinctions are observed, to many higher groups than savages. Not all living men, by any means, are destined to be the ancestors of future generations.

The weakness in the furthest advanced groups is the same as that of the more advanced individuals too. No part of them—no individual, no subsidiary group—can live without the whole. Differentiation and specialization have gone so far that, although as part of the great whole, the individual or the small group functions happily and effectively, it could not function at all, could not even live, apart from the whole. The parts acquire the vulnerabilities of the whole. To the whole often but one mistake is permitted. If one decision is amiss and leads to disorganization, it may be fatal to all its co-operating members which are its self.

There is obviously required, as a part of the evolutionary process, in the creation of the society, as also in the creation of the individual, along with that differentiation and specialization which produces such marvels of efficiency, some protections against disorganization, indiscipline, and liability to fatal error. In the individual made up of many cells there are arrangements for these functions and penalties for misbehavior of the parts which are well understood. In societies they may be equally well understood.12 There are means for cohesion—there is even an instinct of groupiness;13 and there are mechanisms for securing discipline and even mutual help. What has been slowest to develop—as in the animal individual—is the directive or conjunctural apparatus.

Speculation as to the reason for this slowness would require an appraisal of the stage of evolution which human societies have by now reached; and this appraisal would need to be in terms of the logical objectives toward which they appear to be proceeding. But also there would need to be investigation of the transfer of directive authority from the cell to the multicellular organism—from the individual to society—and, indeed, the whole relation of parts to wholes in human association, which is made difficult by the high development of the brain in man and the arrest, or partial arrest,
of individual evolution. It is obvious, I think, that there is an evolutionary pressure in such changes which makes evolution as unthinkable as Trotter says it is:

There is some inherent property in mobile living organisms that makes combination of individuals into larger units a more or less inevitable course of development—without any gross variation being necessary to initiate it. The complex evolution which multicellularity made possible and perhaps enforced can scarcely fail to make one wonder whether the gregarious animal has not entered upon a path which must of necessity lead to increasing complexity and coordination, to a more and more stringent intensity of integration or to extinction.4

Since the advantages of specialization require high co-ordination, reaching, at length, the levels of conjuncture, it seems clear that, unless nature has made a fatal error in the case of man, the individuals of society must possess not only the capacity for the requisite specialization, the proper sympathies, and the instincts for discipline but, even if latent, the requisite capacities for integration and direction. The richest specialization will be of no real use if it cannot be controlled to the uses of the whole organism, and the most perfect control of the individual cells will be incapable of insuring progress if it has no material of original variation to work on.

Not to pursue this matter further, I may perhaps quote a passage from Trotter which seems to me to express the human dilemma not only concisely but completely:

The community of the honey bee bears a close resemblance to the body of a complex animal. The capacity for actual structural specialization of the individuals in the interests of the hive has been remarkable and has gone far, while at the same time co-ordination has been stringently enforced, so that each individual worker bee has practically no activities which are not directly devoted to the hive, and yet she goes about her ceaseless tasks in a way that never fails to impress the observer with its exuberant energy and even its appearance of joyfulness.

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If we could suppose her to be conscious in the human sense, we must imagine the bee to be possessed by an enthusiasm for the hive more intense than a mother's devotion to her son, without personal ambitions, or doubts or fears, and if we are to judge by the imperfect experience man has yet had of the same lofty passion, we must think of her consciousness, insignificant spark as it is, as a little fire ablaze with altruistic feeling. Doubtless, such an attribution of emotion to the bee is a quite unjustified fallacy of anthropomorphism. Nevertheless, it is not altogether valueless as a hint of what social unity might effect in an animal of larger mental life. There can be little doubt that the perfection to which the communal life of the bee has attained is dependent on the very smallness of the mental development of which the individuals are capable. Their capacity to assimilate experience is, necessarily from their structure, and is known by experience to be, small, and they are not, as the most modern biologists believe, provided with anything but the nervous system of a lower animal. Their individuality is limited to the necessity of maintaining the life of the hive. It is not surprising that they should conform to the mould cast for them by the hive, and that they should be incapable of the development of a mental life of their own. This is not surprising, for it is well known that the mental development of the individual of lower animals is dependent on the surrounding environment, and it is equally well known that the mental development of man is independent of this environment.

H. P.
small, and their path is marked out so plainly by actual physical modifications that the almost miraculous absorption of the worker in the hive is after all perhaps natural enough. If she were able to assimilate general experience on a larger scale to react freely and appropriately to stimuli external to the hive, there can be little doubt that the community would show a less concentrated efficiency than it does today. The standing miracle of the bee—her sensitiveness to the voice of the hive and her capacity to communicate with her fellows—would undoubtedly be less marvelously perfect if she were not at the same time deaf to all other voices.\(^1\)

V

Human societies have, of course, not evolved so far as have those of the bees; or else they have taken a different line of development. They are, anyway, compared with the bees, lacking in co-ordination and cohesion, groping for concerted objectives and in jeopardy to disruptive influences. Wherever the human species is going, neither the objectives nor the methods are yet agreed. The method of adaptation to both the physical and the biotic environments may be quite different from those of such species as the bees or the ants; but here, again, there are interesting analogies which deserve further examination than they have yet had. It is to be noted, for instance, that the physical conditions are not very different. The ants inhabit a range of climate which is as varied as that of men. They protect themselves, not by growing winter coats or by hibernating, but by building protective habitations. They have long since left the stage of individuality and have reached a stage of infinitely complex differentiations and interdependences, all woven into a social web. No ant could live alone. Only a far and primitive ancestor could have done that. Such struggles as they have among themselves are far more between well-integrated colonies than between individuals. They have passed beyond the stage of democracy as men mean it—the arrival at social decision through discussion, conflict of opinion, and majority rule—and have become so group-centered and like-minded that there is no surviving authority or obedience. Even their mechanism for physical inheritance is so highly specialized that single mothers carry the responsibilities for the future of whole groups.\(^1\)

Man, of course, has a distinguishing feature which is different from that of the bees and the ants. That is, of course, his brain with its power of reflection and decision. Reflectiveness has led to the accumulation of vast masses of cultural material upon which to exercise this ability. Some observers have regarded this as man's only really distinctive trait. He has been called, for instance, "a time-binder"—meaning that he accumulates, through time, the power to become more and more effective in managing the physical and biotic environments because he uses the accumulated experience of those who have gone before. It has also been pointed out that this mechanism which furnishes so great an advantage also contains the possibility of his greatest danger.

Instead of coming with relative rapidity to the stage at which his societies are controlled by "the spirit of the hive," or even by the operations of well-understood custom or law, man lingers in a stage of intellectual individualism. This would not be dangerous in a thinly settled, noncommunicative world, in which small colonies enjoyed at least relative immunity from the predations of others—such as nineteenth-century

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 105-7.
America was. But in one which has become, through the operations of that superior brain which is his pride, closely settled, which possesses the means of instantaneous world-wide intercommunication and almost instantaneous transport, the temptation of some groups to exterminate others seems irresistible and promises to be fatally effective.

This is partly attributable, of course, to the substitution of teleology for other means of adaptation. There is ample evidence that man has not changed—that his psychological and mental equipment has not been substantially altered—for many thousands of generations. Instead of being shaped by his environment as are other species of living beings, he undertook, far back in prehistory, to go on from where he was, not chiefly by accommodating himself through changes in his body or mind, but by changing everything around him—the earth, the sky, other forms of life—to his requirements. When he began to experiment and invent, he undertook what has proved not only to be an effective control of environment but one which, however effective, may turn out not to have been calculated with sufficient foresight. To be completely successful in his tour de force, he would not only have to know everything but to agree on everything. If he overlooked any important element of the environment, if he failed to gain control of all the elements, or if he failed to secure agreement as to their management, the oversight, the lack of control, or even the controversy, might well prove, at some late stage, disastrous. The disaster would come at a late stage because not until the final tests of world-crowding by his race, the pushing toward the ultimate of the possibilities of nutrition, the approach of finality in instant intercommunication and transportation, would he find out whether he had actually succeeded.

It was a magnificent, a glorious choice. Its unexampled effrontery, its challenge to the forces of the universe, stir the imagination as no other undertaking in the history of life on this planet has the power to do. We are, however, coming to the time when we see that it was, in the deepest meaning of the word, an awful adventure; and we begin to suspect that the great brain of man has got to be worked harder and harder—perhaps harder than it is capable of working—if he is to survive as the final tests come upon him. For up to now he has been more clever, more accumulative, more individually reflective, than profound, in understanding the universe or in agreeing on what is required of him, in the way of discipline, by its conditions.

He has not been freed from the universe and what is in it. He has merely undertaken to understand and use it for his own advantage—which is a very different matter. His impression that he is eternally ingenious is all very well; it has led to marvels, really, of mechanical contrivance; but something more is needed for the tests which he is about to face. He has got to accept, presently, the concomitant of his inventiveness. And this is an almost absolute foresight in the use of inventiveness and an almost perfect accommodation to the constantly new environment it produces. Otherwise it can be seen that what he has created is likely to destroy him. Disagreements, disciplines, conflicts, and resorts to force are all very well, racially considered, so long as they do not actually threaten racial injury or destruction. But they now do that. For force, at the disposal of still dissident and irresponsible groups of men, has at its disposal, in the contemporary world, such products of that superior brain as atom bombs, lethal bacteria, radioactive mists, and other such genuinely ultimate weapons. And force is not
man's only danger; his reproductive apparatus, not being centralized in hive mothers, and calculated, almost like the broadcast pollen, to start a thousand lives that one may survive, is very little subject to the control of the world community in which its effects are made manifest. There is, therefore, no necessary correlation between man's power to produce progeny and his ability to nourish and educate them. As a matter of fact, the disparities here indicate powerful racial forces which favor the as yet unaverted disaster of wholesale starvation. The social disciplines necessary to the regulation of numbers are not yet in being; there is still a fatal dependence on the crude and cruel checks involved in multitudinous deaths before maturity; and man's inherent racial loyalties tend always to limit these. Something more is urgently needed.

VI

This is the background of mankind's compulsion to find a new kind of contriving ability in that rich nature with which he was equipped when he took off into the evolutionary blue so long ago. He must foresee, he must control, he must agree. This means that he must have social mechanisms capable of containing and mastering the forces and materials to be understood, controlled, and socially accepted.

It has to be said of this process, also, that it is a unitary one. It has to comprehend not one, not a few, but all the elements of the environment and the culture—and simultaneously. If there are any which escape, which are not brought into an understood relationship with the central process at given times, they will tend to gain the advantages without accepting the limitations of common living and may therefore become gigantic and monstrous, exploiting the rest. That, indeed, is what can be seen to have happened in economic and social life during the period since the Industrial Revolution and especially in America since 1850. The trusts and cartels have been officially frowned on; but the policy for controlling them has been wholly negative and so wholly ineffective. Today they threaten our civilization with Frankensteinian horrors.

The Development Plan with both spatial and temporal dimension, is the device which the planner offers for the solution of certain of these social and economic problems. He suggests also that it represents an approach to that democracy of which Allee spoke, in which all the parts of the social organism co-operate in a co-ordinated whole as happens in the well-articulated human being. Since the perfection of modern paper-work techniques for administration and the approach to ultimates in communication and transportation, the operation of the Development Plan can hardly be said to be technically impossible for any recognizable colony of men. The natural scientists have posed the ultimatum: "peace or destruction." With this ultimatum insistently demanding to be recognized, delay in abandoning the Smithian economics and Lockeian politics has become a heavy responsibility indeed for those who advocate it.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PEACE: SOCIAL-SCIENCE CHIMERA?

JESSIE BERNARD

INTRODUCTION

Among the social scientists, economists and political scientists have for a long time been prescribing the conditions for peace. In 1776 Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations pointed out that a world-wide division of labor, each region specializing in what it could produce relatively most cheaply, with free trade among all peoples, would maximize the world's productive capacity. In the nineteenth century, men like Herbert Spencer assured us that industrialized societies were so dependent upon one another that war would gradually have to die out. As recently as 1912, Norman Angell described the great illusion that war could be economically profitable to any nation.

It is true that economic interdependence based on Adam Smith's principles would do everything its proponents said it would do. The Wealth of Nations was widely read throughout the world. Men were not ignorant of it. Yet, in the twentieth century, trade barriers rose to heights unknown since the time of mercantilism. Complicated international machinery had to be invented by economists to help nations overcome their self-built economic barriers. There is nothing wrong with the economic prescription that Adam Smith described. But men seemed to want other things more than they wanted the wealth—or peace—such a system would bring.

Political scientists, too, have worked diligently at this problem of peace. They have come up with numerous ingenious inventions in the field of international organization—courts, laws, leagues, treaties, unions. The results of their efforts, like those of the economists, so promising in theory, have not been too successful in the actual world. Men have apparently wanted other things more than they have wanted the benefits secured by such systems.

Psychologists, too, have had their prescriptions for peace, one of the most famous being, of course, William James's prescription of a moral equivalent for war, on the diagnostic assumption, presumably, that modern war was an expression of human nature for which better outlets were possible.

Shelves of books have been written in the above fields, and this brief article is not intended to add to their volume. I wish, rather, to discuss two or three recent essays in this field by other social scientists—cultural anthropologists, social psychologists, and sociologists—and to evaluate their prescriptions for peace.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PEACE

The prescriptions for international peace as set forth by these social scientists might be stated briefly as follows: First, we must learn the importance of unity in diversity, of tolerance of differences.

The world must be kept safe for differences. Knowledge of the problems of others and of alien ways of life must become sufficiently general so that positive toleration becomes possible. . . . The prime problem of the century is indeed whether world order is to be achieved through domination of a single nation that
imposes its life ways upon all others or through some other means that does not deprive the world of the richness of different cultures. ... The anthropologist's solution is unity in diversity; agreement on a set of principles for world morality but respect and toleration for all activities that do not threaten world peace.²

Further, by a unifying survey of all cultures, "anthropologists hope to promote a better understanding of the cultural values of other nations and other times, and thus help to create something of that spirit of tolerant understanding which is an essential condition of international harmony."³

A second prescription states that we must change human nature. "A secure and happy world can be built only from secure and happy individuals,"⁴ and such individuals can be produced only if proper parent-child relationships prevail.

The child who can build his character upon the foundation of trust in the consistent affection of his parents is less likely to be a suspicious adult, seeking and finding enemies within his own group and in other nations. ... A stable world order that takes account of new, wider, and more complex relationships can be founded only upon individual personalities that are emotionally free and mature. ... One, though only one, of the causes of war is the inhibited aggression engendered by the socialization process. Anger ... is ... repressed, providing a canker of hate and resentment that may release its energy in fighting the battles of a group, a social class, or a nation. ... As long as the aggressions of children and of individual adults are met primarily by retaliation, this will remain the dominant pattern for dealing with interclass, inter-racial, and international aggressions.⁵

Krech and Crutchfield specify ten steps in a program for peace, most of them—1 to 9—as presented, involving some kind of change in human nature:

The objectives of a program for reducing international tensions are to eliminate or circumvent the various obstacles to international unity. ... This can be accomplished in the following ways: (1) reducing people's frustrations, (2) making democracy work, (3) improving mental health, (4) educating for international thinking, (5) changing attitudes, (6) developing nonpartisan foreign policy, (7) assuming democratic world leadership, (8) providing positive prerequisites for international unity, (9) reducing ideological conflicts, (10) using techniques short of war in international conflict.⁶

The third prescription is that we apply science to these problems, work out a set of human values based on science, create a climate favorable to the scientific point of view. "Science must create a climate in which it can, itself, operate without widespread destruction."⁷ Our vision must be of "science not as the provider of the agencies of barbarism but science as revealing the order in experience, as heightening the sense of our precarious dependence one upon the other, as the surest and most powerful of internationalizing forces."⁸ The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in June, 1945, at the request of the Department of Social Affairs of the United Nations drafted a proposal for a "United Nations Institute of the Human Sciences" to promote co-operative planning and execution of basic research in the human sciences.⁹ And George Lundberg, pleading eloquently and persuasively for the development and use of the social sciences, implies that if the Social and Cultural Committee of the United Nations were

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¹ Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (1949), pp. 270, 273.
² Ibid., p. 274.
³ Ibid., p. 270.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 222–23, 224, 225.
⁶ Kluckhohn, op. cit., p. 287.
⁷ Ibid., p. 261.
given two billion dollars it might come up with the right answers to international peace."

SOME ASSUMPTIONS THAT SEEM TO UNDERLIE THESE PRESCRIPTIONS: ARE THEY CHIMERICAL?

The prescriptions for peace specified above are doubtless of high moral caliber. I subscribe to them. But it seems to me that they imply, implicitly or explicitly, certain basic and as yet unproved assumptions. They seem, first of all, to rest on the assumption that fundamentally and basically there is harmony in the universe; that conflict is the result, so to speak, of error, a "distortion of reality," perversity, or ignorance; that if we could once discover the principles of this natural harmony and submit ourselves to them, we could achieve our common goals through science. A second assumption is, perhaps, implicit in the first, namely, that science can bridge the gap between conflicting values, that men are willing to accept the scientific solution to a problem, that once science points out the incompatibilities of our wants, we will abide by such findings. In brief, that there are no conflicts among the goals and values within men any more than there are among men. A final assumption, also closely tied up with the first two, is that human nature can and should be changed to certain scientifically prescribed specifications.

Are these assumptions valid or are they chimerical? Let us examine them in some detail.

IS THERE NATURAL HARMONY IN THE WORLD?

The essentially static approach which characterizes cultural anthropology has made it peculiarly susceptible to the assumptions of a basic harmony in the world. One looks in vain for meaningful analyses of conflict or competition in anthropological literature. Conflict and competition are viewed in terms of personality traits fostered or suppressed by a cultural matrix or as institutional patterns with many alternatives. Cultural anthropology has not come to grips with the true nature of conflict.

The assumption of a natural harmony in the world takes many forms. Sometimes it takes the form of a belief that all that is needed to assure peace is tolerance, a welcoming, rather than a fear, of diversity; that mutual understanding will lead to peaceful adjustments of differences. From this it follows that our mutual fears and anxieties are irrational, unfounded. If we could get rid of these irrational fears, peace would be feasible. Sometimes this assumption of natural harmony takes the form of a belief that all people want the same things, the implication being that, since we really have common interests, why not be reasonable and work together for our common goals. Sometimes it takes the form of implying that people are rational, wanting only mutually compatible goals; that, once told the scientific facts, they will be able to accept them and act accordingly. Their choices will reflect the outer harmony.

Is there no such thing, really, as true conflict in the sense of complete incompatibility of values and goals among peoples? Can all cultures pursue their goals without interfering with the pursuit of their goals by other cultures? Will tolerance of diversity mean peace, since each culture is compatible with every other?

Would "studying world cultures in... [a] comparative setting," really, as anthropologists hope, "promote a better understanding of the culture values of other..."
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other nations and other times, and thus help to create something of that spirit of tolerant understanding which is an essential condition of international harmony?" Suppose, as a test of this assumption, that a team of social scientists gave us a complete and objective account of Russian culture at the present time. We learned its major values, interpretations, and orientations in as great detail as Kluckhohn prescribes. We saw it in a universal framework. And suppose that a similarly scientific picture of our culture were given to the Russians. No evaluations, no propaganda, just straightforward, scientific—anthropological, if you will—analyses. We would understand one another much better. Would it make peace more certain?

Differences between our culture and Russian culture might still horrify us even if we understood them in their cultural setting. To use a well-worn example, as we see it, the liquidation of thousands of kulaks was a shocking thing. We would understand it better if we learned from the cultural anthropologist that the Russian Communists justify it in this manner: Under a capitalistic system thousands of people are sacrificed every year for lack of medical care or other preventable reasons, for no good purpose. They die meaninglessly. When we Russians liquidate people, their deaths mean something. A great social objective is achieved. We are opposed to useless destruction of life, such as goes on in capitalistic systems. We are not opposed to destruction of life that serves some great purpose.

This principle of subordinating means to ends may have a long and honorable history in Russian culture; it may make sense there, for all we know. But our own culture condemns it. Would our understandings of it make us more tolerant of it? The conditions of conflict exist here. If you accept one set of principles, you must automatically reject the other. Kluckhohn recognizes that "in the case of the conflicting ideologies of the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, it may well be ... that no stable equilibrium is possible unless one culture destroys the other"; but he believes it more probable that a stable equilibrium would be possible if we evolve "a new set of cultural assumptions... which absorbs and reconciles what is permanently valuable to the human animal in both opposing ways of life." Is it possible to absorb and reconcile the two principles which we have used as illustrations of conflicting ideologies? Can one even say, with respect to such opposing principles, let's be reasonable and compromise? If we cannot reconcile them, every other year we will follow one set, alternate years the other. Or in certain fields we will follow one set, in other fields the other. Obviously not. There is a basic conflict in ideology here. If one prevails, the other does not. Reconciliation is not possible. Each may be culturally justified. Understanding this fact does not mitigate the conflict.

In such cases we can leave each other alone, not try to absorb or reconcile or accept the others', but just be tolerant of differences, prescribes the anthropologist, who "realizes that any piece of unfamiliar behavior is an expression of another people's total cultural experience." We can live and let live; for it is fatal to all hopes for peace when Americans see every evidence of other nations' different cultural assumptions as examples of their moral perfidy. The alternatives are not to agree or to reject, it is possible to accept other assumptions

\[\text{Knockhohn, op. cit., p. 274.}\]
in the sense of facing the fact of their existence and understanding them. To the extent that both policy makers and public realize that the values of any two societies in conflict cannot be suddenly altered by supposedly logical demonstrations of their invalidity, the danger of pathological suspicions on each side is lessened. Reciprocal misunderstandings grow by mutual stimulating unless each party will substitute the question “reasonable in terms of their premises?” for “reasonable?” (meaning: compatible with our own premises which have never been thought through or even brought to the light of consciousness). The genuine conflicts of interests between two or more powers could often be resolved through compromise were not irrational emotional forces mobilized through culture-bound misinterpretations of motives. Relative to one group, the other appears unreasonable, unable to see the logical consequences, folly, and immorality of its own actions, and acquires the character of an evil force that must be attacked.*

Very well. We have now admitted the existence of mutually incompatible cultural goals. But we are going to let them have theirs without inflicting ours. This prescription—to live and let live—appeals to Americans. It is the kind of solution one would expect American anthropologists to prescribe. It is congenial to our ideology. If we cannot reconcile our differences, let us at least not attack one another.

But does this appeal equally to persons with a different—and conflicting—ideology? Is Kluckhohn’s generosity not as culture-bound as the prejudices and misunderstandings of others? Is his supracultural point of view compatible with the Russian ideology which we referred to above?

The Russians, we are told, who are tolerant of cultural diversity, are determined to free the world from exploitation by the capitalist class. From their point of view, they are not out to impose their system on the rest of the world. We need posit no moral perfidy. Indeed, we may be generous and impute to them high moral idealism, as high as our own. They are out to free men—you and me. It is only our cultural blindness which makes us love our slavery. They, objectively, can see how exploited we are. They want to help us achieve the goals that we would surely want if we were rational and had all the facts before us, if we were not blinded by propaganda and honeyed escapes furnished by our masters. To achieve this—to them noble—end, wholesale killing, even war, may be worth the price. Is there here the harmony of interests which underlies the anthropologist’s prescription of tolerance of diversity? Must we be tolerant of an ideology which, in effect, must destroy ours, even with the best intentions in the world? Can we expect them to be tolerant of an ideology which condemns theirs so completely? How can the best-intentioned tolerance exist where differences are mutually irreconcilable, incompatible? Just what kind of cultural assumptions could absorb and reconcile these opposing values?

My own inclinations lie wholly with the anthropologist’s prescription. I feel we ought to look at the other culture’s point of view, to act in ways to allay their fears, to make them feel secure so that they will not feel they have to defend themselves. I dislike the flourishing of atomic bombs in their faces or jet-propelled missiles or round-the-world non-stop flights or North Atlantic pacts. The suggestion that we act pacifically, even appeasingly, is congenial to me. This, we are told, was the policy toward Russia originally planned by the United States under Roosevelt. We are told that it failed, that the Russian cultural interpretation of our behavior was one of weakness, contempt for effeciveness, and result-

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*3 Ibid.
ed in a greater drive to furnish the world with strong and powerful leadership. There are even now sizable segments of the population, by no means all Communists or even Communist sympathizers, who urge this policy, so directly in line with the anthropologist’s prescription. But the suspicion lurks uneasily that perhaps such views are as culture-bound as those of the Russians; for we are told that when we became more aggressive in the cold war, countered aggression with aggression, the Russians retreated. Newspaper and military analysts report that—at least until the promulgation of the North Atlantic Pact—the outlook for peace was better than when we followed a more pacifistic policy. This sort of thing shakes one’s confidence in the scientist’s prescription. Perhaps the tolerance that he prescribes presupposes a mutuality of interest which just does not exist. And perhaps he is too culture-bound to understand the nature of the conflict involved.

Another form of the universal harmony assumption is the belief, as Lundberg states it, that “the broad general wants of people are perhaps everywhere highly uniform”; that “they want . . . [is] a certain amount of physical and social security and some fun”; that it is only “disagreement over the means to toward these ends, as represented by fantastic ideologies, that results in conflict and chaos”; that “there has always been remarkable agreement that physical survival, security, and a livelihood for the individual and for the group are desirable ends.” Since we all really want the same things, we should be able to work together to achieve them.

The use of the expression “highly uniform” and “remarkable agreement” in connection with human wants appears as a semantic fallacy. It creates the illusion of identity of wants. Actually, wanting the same things may mean wanting quite different things, and mutually incompatible things. For me to achieve security, decent living conditions, survival, may mean that you cannot achieve them. Wanting the same things by no means implies common interests; it may involve conflicting interests. Furthermore, Lundberg’s is a highly simplified version of what people want. They do, in spite of science, in spite of reason, want incompatible things. And they want their own culture, sometimes much more than they want security or fun or even survival. This leads to a consideration of the second assumption which seems to underlie some of the prescriptions of peace which we are discussing.

WILL SCIENCE LEAD MEN TO CHOOSE PEACE?

Lundberg tells us that it is the scientist’s business “to determine reliably the immediate and remote costs and consequences of alternate possible courses of action, and to make these known to the public” so that “as a result of scientific knowledge, men will not want impossible or mutually exclusive things.” The assumption is that knowing scientific facts will lead people to act on scientific principles, that science can alter men’s goals. Before examining this assumption, I should like to point out that it is unquestionably true that science is, as Lundberg affirms and reaffirms, the best way to achieve any ends that man may be striving for. It is equally true that different men want different and mutually incompatible ends. Science can be used by both groups. It can tell them how to fight. If each group uses science to achieve its ends, as Lundberg prescribes, we have science fighting science. As yet, not enough people really care to know how not to fight. Can they

15 Ibid., p. 29.
be made to want peace above everything else? Can we use science to impose this value on people? We could. But science can also be used by those who do not want peace, to impose a fighting psychology on people. Where, then, are we getting? Anyone, as Lundberg insists, can use science for any end whatsoever. We can even use science to fight science and to impose science on our enemies, just as they can use science to protect themselves against this imposition. But this is no prescription for peace. Lundberg himself admits that one group may have to impose a scientific solution on its opponents. We have gained fighting efficiency through science, perhaps, but not peace.

This is not, however, the point which needs to be made here. What we wish to examine here is the fact that men often reject science even when it is demonstrably superior to other ways of reaching their—assumed—ends. And even when they do use science, they often reject its advice. Lundberg pleads that if science could make perfectly clear what the costs of alternative courses of action were, men would choose wisely. He believes that controversy, frustration, and despair are the results of conflict not over goals and values but over means. As a matter of fact, what men do is to make nonrational choices and then ask science to minimize the costs. They are more likely to ask science for victory than for peace.

We pointed out above that Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations advocated a system which would have made for peace. Kluckhohn repeats it in a slightly different context. "Nations," he tells us, "like children, need to be socialized. By parallel, an extension of dependency among nations would seem to be the right direction in which to move. In so far as nations recognized their mutual interdependence they would be willing to submit to the renunciations which socialization inevitably involves." The economic history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries belies this optimistic prediction completely, as we indicated above. Nations were not willing to submit to scientifically prescribed renunciations.

Demography also illustrates the point that we are making. As long ago as 1929, a population expert predicted that, unless some provision were made for the explosive population growth resulting from industrialization in the Orient, war would follow. The empty places in the world had all been pre-empted by the white races in the nineteenth century. Now that industrialization in the Orient was quickening the rate of population growth there, no relief was available for the resulting pressure. The white races had fenced in the empty places and hung up signs "For Whites Only."

Here was a perfectly scientific analysis. The white races are no longer increasing rapidly. They may be approaching a stationary level. They are probably not going to fill up all the empty places in the near future. Why not permit Orientals to fill them up? In time the rate of increase of Oriental populations will decline—by well-known demographic processes—as the population ages. But, in the meanwhile, until this happens, some relief must be made available.

We knew these facts. Were we willing to act on them? Were the white races willing to turn over to Oriental races any or enough of their own resources to tide them over the swarming period? Are we even now willing to see our cultural values endangered by receiving the bearers of foreign cultures? If we want to pre-

[16] Ibid., p. 103.

vent wars, the demographers tell us, we have to make some provision for these facts. Do we want to prevent war enough? Or do we want other values more?

It is sheer magic, Kluckhohn tells us, to suppose that we can have peace without some sacrifice. If, as science insists, we must make a choice between war and sacrifice of cultural values, probably a great many people would choose war. In other words, there are many things we want—irrational as it may seem—more than we want peace. Cultural autonomy is probably one. We could have peace if we were willing to pay whatever price was asked. It does not take a very astute social scientist to point this out. But still there are—culturally determined—personalities who shout with Patrick Henry that they would rather die than pay the asking price.

There is another angle to this problem that deserves attention. Contrasting Russian values with our own above, we found it perfectly rational that we should reject certain of their principles. We were emphasizing what our culture considers their failures. Let us now emphasize, instead, their virtues—scientifically determined—personalities who shout with Patrick Henry that they would rather die than pay the asking price.

If we were scientific in our approach to cultural values, we would not be irrationally biased in favor of our own. If other cultures were demonstrably superior to ours, we would be willing to sacrifice our own. How would this work out? The Russians have been acting on many of the principles Kluckhohn prescribes for at least a generation. They have, for example, fostered, even encouraged, cultural diversity in their union. They have attempted to give everyone security. They have, we are told, almost licked race prejudice—certainly, racial discrimination. They have been making it more probable that we could undergo necessary sacrifices. They have accepted completely the doctrine that human nature can and should be changed, and they have, so far as attitudes and motivations are concerned, changed it. On these tests, as set up by anthropological science, they rank higher than we on a scale for evaluating cultures. On the criteria which Kluckhohn sets up as bases for peace, the Russian culture may be superior to ours. It is carrying out many of his prescriptions. Does such a scientific finding make us any more likely to choose the Russian way?

The one thing science could do for us at the present time is the one thing we will not permit it to do. That one thing is to determine whether or not the mutual fears of Soviet Russia and the United States are justified and rational. As a professional designer of research projects I view this as the supreme research task of the age. But such a project would involve regiments of investigators, including anthropologists, social psychologists, sociologists, economists, demographers, statistical analysts, prying in and out of everywhere—field, factory, files of confidential facts. With such complete access to all the relevant data, they could answer the questions asked, namely: "Under what conditions, if any, can the Soviet and the American systems live together without destroying or injuring one another?" Science is perfectly competent to do the job. If such a research project should demonstrate that the two systems could not share the same world, then the great decision would have to be made by both sides. Is our culture, are our values, worth the price of war? How much sacrifice are we willing to make to prevent war? Is war preferable to cultural subversion? Science would then have done what the sociologist says it can do—presented
and clarified alternative choices and the costs of each. If we then chose destruction after all the facts were in, we would at least be doing it with our eyes open. If, on the other hand, the research project should demonstrate that neither system need, in fact, be a threat to the other, the great incubus or irrational fear could be removed. If both could be shown capable of sharing a common world, a creative *modus vivendi* could be worked out in an atmosphere of security rather than one of suspicion and fear. Technicians could handle the details.

That is the supreme contribution which science could make. But the rub is this: Can anyone imagine Russia permitting such a study? She will not allow her "corrective" labor camps (labeled "slave" camps by outsiders) to be studied. She imposes the most impenetrable barriers between even ordinary living conditions and the outside observer. Even scientists are not welcome. Would she—or would we, for that matter—co-operate in such a study? Without such co-operation it could not be done. There is nothing in science or scientific method that can impose itself on people.

We are back, therefore, where we started. All the scientific prescriptions in the world are probably futile so long as people do not want to submit their cause to science or, if they do, to accept the results. Scientific prescriptions make the perhaps unscientific assumption that men want the good things for which the scientists are prescribing. Science is of no avail to the patient who prefers his symptoms to the remedies prescribed.

Before we turn to a detailed consideration of the assumption that human nature can be made to order, I should like to point out some of the demands which the scientific method itself makes of human nature. Many religions make radical demands of human nature, such as renunciation and sacrifice. Scientific method makes demands equally exacting. It requires that its devotees submit completely to objective evidence. Wishful thinking must be abandoned. No matter how much one longs for certain results, no trace of such longing may creep into the scientist's behavior. The discipline here involved is as "inhuman" as that of the ascetic who learns to ignore the longings of his body. It is true that both religion and science offer substitute rewards, so that in time both the saint and the scientist find satisfaction in their discipline.

But not all people are alike. Not all are equally qualified for either a saintly or a scientific career. Religious devotees learned long ago that they must be content with a limited fellowship, a communion of those elite capable of the rigors of renunciation. Many scientists, on the other hand, still believe that it is possible for everyone to submit to the scientific method. They are as ambitious for their method of salvation as many devoted Christians have been. They feel that, since they have learned to achieve so much satisfaction from the rewards of science, all men can do likewise. Perhaps all "saved" people wish thus to extend their blessings to others.

Thus, when scientific enthusiasts eagerly promulgate science as a philosophy of life, they are, in fact, pleading for a radical change in "human nature," the same kind of change which Christianity or Hinduism requires. They are asking men to submit their conflicts to a method which outlaws bias, wishful thinking, self-deception; a method which insists on an abandonment of dearly beloved non-rational values. They are asking that men be willing to sacrifice goals in which their egos are deeply involved. No wonder that many shudder at the prospect.
Almost everyone is willing to use scientific methods as tools to achieve goals which he values, to impose his values on others. But where there is a conflict of values, only a very limited number of men are ready to submit to a method which is not biased in their favor. "Human nature" is no more amenable to scientifically indicated sacrifices than to religiously prescribed ones.

The problem which enthusiasts for science tend to minimize is precisely this unwillingness of men to submit their conflicts to science. If men would do so, then a millennium could be achieved. It is this first hurdle which is the most important problem of all.

**CAN HUMAN NATURE BE MADE TO ORDER?**

We come, then, to the third great assumption underlying the peace prescriptions of the social scientists, the assumption that human nature can be tailored, so to speak, to secure peace. There are a number of subassumptions involved that I should like to consider separately, namely: (1) that modern wars have anything to do with human nature; (2) that human nature can be created at will; and (3) that, if human nature cannot be changed, at least it can be harnessed.

Many social scientists, analyzing the inward drives and motivations which they believe make for war, write as though they believe that there is some connection between individual aggression and modern war. Is there? Modern war is a great technological enterprise, like modern industry. It is one of the most highly organized activities that man has ever engaged in. There is, for most men, little outlet for aggression in it. It probably creates more aggression than it allows expression to. Boredom is the great *bête noire* of the modern soldier.

Resentment against caste and bureaucracy is a close second. Frustration is more common than the exhilaration of expressed aggressions. There may have been a close connection between war and human nature in primitive times—when organized warfare was probably not so very common—but there is little now. There is rarely a spontaneous popular clamor for war. We have had people who talked anxiously of a preventive war with Russia. But war is not actively sought by many people.

The social psychologists, focused more sharply than the cultural anthropologists on our own culture, see greater diversity among human beings than the cultural anthropologist does who is looking for common traits rather than differences. Social psychologists tell us that some persons need wars. It is not nearly so simple as Communists put it, that is, plutocratic "Wall Street" doing everything "it" can to embroil us in a war that will be paid for by the "toiling masses." Many people on Wall Street fear and hate war as much as anyone else, just as many of the "toiling masses" in the depression thirties argued that what we needed was a war to insure full employment (or "toil," if you will), and we must not forget that it was not only in occupied Germany that many people "never had it so good." War does satisfy the varying needs of many people. But it is not because of aggression or other inherent aspects of human nature. Aggression is the modern version of the old instinct of pugnacity. One is about as meaningful as the other, so far as interpreting modern wars is concerned. There is, in fact, little, if any, connection between "human nature" and modern war.

The implicit requirement in most social science (as, indeed, of most other) prescriptions for peace—that human na-
ture be changed—is a very old one. At one time the standard technique for achieving this goal was through religion. It was up to the church to create the kind of human nature that peace, or other desirable conditions, required. Man's stubbornly evil nature had to be remade; the new man had to replace the old Adam. We were required to be born again.

After many centuries of failure, new methods for achieving this essentially old goal are eagerly sought. Thus, when the science of modern genetics first became popular, the movement known as "eugenics" developed. The hope was expressed that now we could at last create to specifications the kind of human being that we chose, as we had learned to breed animals to specification. The illusory nature of that hope is now evident. Not only are there numerous genetic difficulties in the way, but the social odds are tremendous against it. The mental, moral, and social traits which we need for good human relationships are not inherited. We can't do much about them through the genes.

But the hope persists. Now the accepted technique among social scientists for creating the kind of human nature we want is through culture change, especially in parent-child relations. The same hope underlies these present-day assumptions—that we can create the kind of human nature we want by cultural changes—as lay back of the Christian mission and the eugenic crusade. By proper child training we are to produce emotionally secure individuals who will have a minimum of aggressive tendencies. We must create a kind of personality that will take willingly to sacrifice, again a function formerly fulfilled by the church.

A great deal is made to depend in all these discussions on the nature of human nature. "You can't change human nature" is countered by a wide variety of data on the extreme plasticity of human nature. In different times and in different places, human nature has been very different. I must confess I have never quite seen the relevance of this reply. Granted that the Zuni and the Kwakiutl and the Dobuans have different human natures, granted that the ancient Greeks were motivated by different incentives from those that actuate us, so what? What does this prove except the great pliability of human nature? It does not answer the basic problems involved in creating human nature to order.

Many of these problems are the same as those which arose in the case of eugenics. What kind of human nature do we really want? Would we want the kind of human nature created to the social scientist's specifications for peace? Do we even all agree on the kind of human nature we want? If we create the kind of human nature that has few aggressions—assuming that this has anything to do with a modern war—will it be adequate to other tasks imposed by modern living? Do we want placid, unstimulated, inventive personalities? Suppose the kind of personality we need for peace is not the kind we need for other goals and values which we also cherish? Like drive, inventiveness, powerful motivations, strong ego-involvements?

Could such secure people even defend the culture that created them? Who knows the number of lovely, gracious, complacent cultures, without protection, which have been swallowed up by more aggressive ones? We must remind ourselves that history is written, as the wit points out, not by people who are right but by people who are left. And the people who are left are those who cared enough for their culture to fight for it.
They had to be at least that aggressive. Could any culture preserve itself if it cultivated a peaceful, unaggressive, placid, compliant type of personality while its neighbors cultivated just the opposite? Today throughout the world the nonaggressive cultures exist at the pleasure of the aggressive ones.18

Let us grant that it would be possible to shear generation after generation of its aggressive tendencies under the kind of parent-child pattern prescribed by the cultural anthropologists and social psychologists. Unless all peoples everywhere did the same thing, it would be like cleaning the Augean stables. Otherwise, each generation of complacent, unaggressive people could be mowed down by their more aggressive neighbors.

There are, of course, many facets to human nature. Human nature has changed remarkably so far as goals and values have changed. But has it changed enough to cease to want its own values to survive? Perhaps the peoples who were self-sacrificing in this respect have died out. Kluckhohn points out that "society exploits many of the oversocialized, too conscientious, too moral and self-denying." Maybe cultures of this high moral character have been exploited, too. If we create personalities without aggression, perhaps they, too, will be willing to take cultural self-sacrifice without fighting back. Even if this were always possible—and the history of the Jews, who could not commit cultural suicide even when they made it a deliberate policy, throws some light on its feasibility—the question persists, Is this what we really want? If a valid social science presented us with this as an alternative to war, which would we choose?

We do not have to assume that men fight wars for evil ends. They fight wars for the ends that seem good to them—to secure the Holy Land from the infidel, to free men from bondage (slavery or exploitation), to spread the benefits of Kultur, to make the world safe for democracy, to end war. In the moral climate of today no war could be prosecuted which admitted ends not sanctioned by the cultures of the people who are expected to die for them. It is not, then, because men are evil that we have war but because they value certain ends. Taming their aggressions would have to be accompanied by raveling out their cultural ego-involvements.

If communism should win the world from a nonaggressive opponent, we can imagine people in the future shuddering at how closely the world escaped the yoke of exploitive capitalism in the twentieth century, rejoicing that fortunately the great leaders of that time rose to the occasion and saved mankind from such a horrible fate. The human nature of posterity is not on the side of those who are saintly but on the side of those who win. Those who see the difficulties involved in creating human nature to specifications argue that we do not have to change human nature. All we have to do is use it properly. We have not had to change the physical, chemical, geographical, or other properties of the earth; all that we had to do was understand and use them. "So with human nature it is not a matter of 'changing' the fundamental drives and instincts; it is simply a matter of understanding these forces and..."
turning them to more constructive and wholesome channels than the strifes and frustrations that make up so much of life, even in the midst of our material plenty.²⁵⁶

This statement reminds us very forcibly of the old classical economists who exalted "private vices" as "public virtues." They saw human selfishness as the great dynamo of economic activity. Then economic man was conceived not as a monstrous being who was made for war but as a necessary motor to drive the economy. The classical economist saw economic activity as a constructive and wholesome channel for human energy. The Nazis were also masters at the art of turning human drives into channels which they set. It can be done. Human drives can be channeled into constructive and wholesome activities, and I think they should be. But here again the facts of conflict cannot be overlooked. Unless we have a monopoly on the channeling of human drives, there may be others who wish to channel them into activities that we deplore.

I do not wish to leave the impression that I do not believe in science, for I do. But, in order for science to be used, there must be consensus with respect to goals sought. It demands co-operation. Conflict is the one area where science is short and impotent. Men can be persuaded to submit everything to the judgment of science except their values.

What I have said about conflict does not necessarily mean either that prevention of war is impossible or that war is inevitable. It seems to me that men will stagger toward a world organization without benefit of scientific prescriptions, by a process which Cooley called the "tentative process" and Ward, "the sympodal." They will try one thing, then another. In the meanwhile the world is organizing itself, as Churchill pointed out in his Boston address, at an unprecedented rate. When this organization has been completed, social scientists will describe the process and promulgate the laws according to which it took place.

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It is a commonplace that we live in a time of crisis. We hear of a crisis in the control of technology and the sciences; another in social policy; still others in morality and in the arts, whose vigor and cultural significance are in doubt; and so on to a crisis in the consciousness that we have (or lack) of our destiny—whether it be subject to the circumstances of history, the laws of thermodynamics, or the judgment of God. It is equally a commonplace that, while all these crises are felt to be related, we do not discover their common root because we are preoccupied with specialties and technicalities. Philosophy, by tradition at least, might have been expected to produce some hints of a broad wisdom about high matters; but philosophers are no less professionalized than other people, and they often appear most concerned with developing techniques for making the trivial analytically precise or for ingeniously avoiding commitments about what is not trivial.

But now we find a rather unusual number of books which both concern themselves with some version of the general crisis and can claim to be philosophical in the old sense of seeking insight into ultimate questions. Several of the authors are not philosophers, professionally; and their books are addressed to us all in our capacity as philosophers. Moreover, they are all dubious about the epistemological fussiness of much recent philosophy in its attempt to be analytical and "scientific." This seems, therefore, to be an appropriate occasion to discuss the proposed sources of a wisdom which would have significance beyond any special interest and to explore the possible relations between such wisdom and the present crisis in its many ramifications.

In facing present problems, however, we ought to recall that great men have warned against any simple application of philosophic wisdom to immediately practical affairs. Aristotle, for example, would say that the global crisis in culture, relating to the regulation of atomic energy as well as to the spiritual enrichment of the community, is a political problem in the broad sense. But the practical wisdom directly relevant to such matters is quite different from sophia proper. The latter, indeed, is doubly divine, both as a knowledge of divine things and as of a kind which either God alone or God above all might have; it is the highest achievement to which we can aspire. But, although it therefore enters practical deliberations as the chief of the intellectual virtues which society should develop among its citizens, a philosophic view of what is best in the universe is a part of the good life rather than a determinant of what is good in concrete situations. Prudent actions, on the contrary, depend much more upon habits and experience than upon a knowledge of.

first principles and causes. Thales possessed *sophia*, but he fell into a well.

Plato, to be sure, thinks of human virtues and sound institutions as more or less inadequate reflections of the Good, at once the first principle of things, of actions, and of inquiries. But knowledge of the Good, if it exists, is not literally communicable; and anybody who happened to have it would be likely to look ridiculous. Moreover, men can acquire the dialectical discipline needed for attaining such knowledge only if they already have a moral character fashioned in the image of the Good. Notwithstanding Plato’s denial of a real distinction between the theoretical and the practical, since virtue is knowledge, his judgment that the unifying insight cannot be made available in a negotiable form for practical applications is as emphatic as Aristotle’s; for wisdom cannot be poured into us in spite of what the professors of education say. That was Protagoras’ mistake.

In Kant there is an analogue, for our purposes, to Aristotelian distinctions. The metaphysics of nature and of morals which constitute philosophy in the strict sense are also the full and complete development of human reason. But, although to philosophize is part of every man’s duty to seek his own perfection, it is not an essential condition of good actions. Even moral philosophy does not direct, but rather supports, the rational determination of the will; for the moral consciousness is present in everyone, and philosophy has chiefly the negative function of defending moral insight against the specious arguments which always arise to subvert it.

Finally, in case these authorities seem to represent an outmoded intellectualistic tradition, we may note the recent example of Dewey, who reminds us rather of Plato than of Aristotle and Kant. Orienting his thought about the intellectual reconstruc-

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2. *Republic* vii. 518B.
4. *Ibid.; cf. also the preface to the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.*
DISCUSSION

It is no disparagement of Whitehead's philosophy, nor does it imply disrespect for the warm Christianity of Mr. Beer's closing chapters, to remark that, as a cure for moral irrationalism, this line of argument can be expected to complicate the disease. We shall have more to say about the ways in which religion and metaphysics may enrich life and affect choices; but, if the rationality of all decisions depends directly upon prior conclusions about the universe as a whole, we are in a bad way indeed. To the degree that he succeeds in convincing a defeatist world of such an opinion, Mr. Beer is not likely to argue it into a faith in something which transcends nature and history. But the issue concerns a confusion of assumptions rather than the strategies of rhetoric.

He has been misled by a too simple analogy between "cosmic epochs," as Whitehead calls them, and periods of social stability. It is not self-contradictory to think that both may pass, giving way to new orders. But, while men have been habituated to live according both feudal and industrial patterns, stones have not been habituated to fall upward. Social fluidity and discontinuity occur against the relatively stable background of nature, whether the world is continuously creative or not; and, even if reality "joints in real togetherness all the manifold pluralities," our deliberations will still take place within the flux of history and will be concerned with applying variable means to shifting circumstances. It is an odd rationality which claims that "irrationality" on a cosmic scale is relevant to our deliberations.

Discussions of this kind do not help us to "control our future," though they make a course of lectures lively by injecting spurious melodrama into subjects whose intrinsic drama is more austere (Mr. Beer is the popular teacher of Harvard's course on "Western Thought and Institutions"). And these red herrings are not redeemed by sound assertions that philosophic principles are implicated in choices or by rhetorical presentations of philosophic and religious propositions that are in themselves above reproach.

Related considerations emerge from a study of John Wild's Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, for he, too, moves directly from metaphysical doctrine to practical resolu-

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2 Beer, op. cit., p. 89.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 9.
tions, although for him the crisis is not one of defeatism but of "unnatural" insubordination in society, arising from failure to understand principles of natural law. He is also similar to his Harvard colleague in that the emphasis is upon believing certain propositions about nature and God rather than upon an activity of reflection that is characteristically philosophic. That is, both teach "wisdom," conceived as a set of beliefs, by rhetorical devices, as Protagoras did, rather than teaching it, alternatively conceived as the ability to think according to sound principles and methods, by dialectical questioning in the Socratic fashion.

The true doctrine in this case is what Mr. Wild calls "realism," and he has founded an Association for Realistic Philosophy to propagate it. It is a synthesis of the classical tradition of Plato and Aristotle which reached its most perfect expression in the works of Aquinas, although it still needs completion by an adequate philosophy of society and history. Its basic doctrines are three: (1) "There is a world of real existence which men have not made or constructed; (2) this real existence can be known by the human mind; and (3) such knowledge is the only reliable guide to human conduct, individual and social."

Except for some reservations about the restrictive "only" in the third clause, it would be hard to find many people—even philosophers—who would not accept these propositions in some sense. So the force of Wild's message depends upon his "realistic" analysis of their meaning and implications. Briefly stated, the first two theses are directed against subjectivists, Kantians, idealists, and phenomenalists, a group which is made to include nearly all philosophers from Descartes (perhaps from Scotus and Ockham) to Bertrand Russell. Differently expressed, they mean that "being" is the primary term of philosophical analysis and that one should account for knowledge by reference to the natures of things, in contrast to the persistent modern tendency to approach things by way of principles founded on an examination of modes of knowing—whether these principles be forms of thought, elements of immediate experience, or the structure of language. It is significant, too, that these alternatives are always attacked as aberrations rather than explored as possible standpoints for discussing philosophic problems. The third salvo is aimed at everyone who rejects "natural law" as Mr. Wild understands it. Since this is an introductory book, the metaphysical and epistemological theses are elaborated only as required for the purposes of ethics and "the philosophy of nature," which are emphasized both for their practical bearings and because their subject matters are more intelligible to the unsophisticated.

So it is the third thesis, about natural law and the "natural order of human culture," which is both dominant in the book and most directly related to our theme. Its principle is that "a moral philosophy rests upon a theory of the nature of man and the whole natural world," so that the first half of Mr. Wild's book, dedicated to "the perfection of human nature (ethics)" is logically dependent upon the latter half, on the philosophy of nature and its subdivisions, "the evolving world" (with reference to God as its first cause) and "philosophical anthropology."

Since Plato and Aristotle are viewed through the eyes of Aquinas, the discussion of natural law reflects the latter's conception that the world was created according to exemplars in God, giving everything its appointed place and end in the Divine Plan. It is this which gives a special significance to the statement that "as soon as we understand the nature of any finite thing we also understand the general kind of activity or treatment which perfects that thing."

In this book this means not only that rationality is the "actuality" or differentia of man, in the sense of Aristotle's physical works but also that the proper complexion of human actions and associations is also quite literal.
ly determined by nature.  

This may be an improvement upon Aristotle, but it certainly involves a suppression of Aristotle's distinction between the theoretic sciences, whose subject matter is invariant and necessary, and the practical sciences, concerned with habits and actions which men may or may not have or perform, and which neither have essential natures in the strict sense nor are derivable from the nature of man. By nature we have capacities for acquiring various virtues and vices, so that the political scientist must, of course, know the elementary facts about the soul, and we can speak metaphorically of "natural" justice; but Aristotle sanctions no simple transition from one kind of "nature" to the other.

The upshot of this analogizing is that natural law is "enforced" by the "sanctions" of "natural punishments," and we can go from "natural" ethical principles to a "natural" social hierarchy, where all our arts and enterprises would be in proper subordination to the theoretic sciences and philosophy. The latter "consist of universal insights into the nature of some kind of being. It is by such immaterial insights that all the technical motions and powers of men must be directed." Thus the practical realm is subordinated to the theoretic. But the theoretic sciences are, in turn, subordinate to religion.

It is obvious that the modern world shows little regard for such a hierarchy.

The interesting thing about these conclusions is that they seem to tell us that the world should be managed by philosophers and scientists but not by the kind of mind that is guided by the prescriptive laws of morality are just as natural as the laws of falling bodies."

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and practical considerations are unified in a theology founded on faith, the gift of grace, and interpreted to men by an authoritative church.

It seems that all three of his favorite philosophers—who are, indeed, wise men—have their own ways of denying Mr. Wild's identifications. When philosophy is taught as a set of canonical propositions, without dialectical examination of the different ways in which they may be justified and of their consequent differences in meaning, one wonders whether anyone is the wiser.

Our first two authors have tried to persuade us to accept beliefs about an order in the world as the archetype for order in human life. M. van Mierlo, an industrial engineer whose views are arresting because they echo recurrent philosophic themes, asks us first to change ourselves in order to be able better to understand the world. Here, then, we have a contrary tendency to treat the theoretical in moral terms. In La Science, la raison, et la foi he wants not to establish a new system but, by discussing a series of questions, to exhibit a method which will serve us in our reflections; and the twin bases of this method—at once "natural" and "scientific"—are "faith" in a coherent reality to be revealed by intelligence and "love" of truth.20 By profession, he says, he has become accustomed to seek truth without regard for sentiment, to avoid credulity and idle speculation, but also to accept reasonable probabilities where complete knowledge is beyond our powers. In short, he looks for wisdom in the scientific method when it is expanded beyond concern for any special subject matter and conceived as an attitude of mind.

M. van Mierlo is reminiscent of Rousseau in his account of how we fall away from innocence. We established rapport with the world so rapidly during our first years "because we did not resist the total expansion of our being. We had no preconceived ideas, no doubts, and the plentitude of reality remained accessible."21 But, as our egos developed, "we no longer paid attention to all of the real, but above all to that which seemed good for us. Our world thus began to limit itself."22 Moreover, conceptions imposed by an "artificial" education and the demands of society supplied further restrictions to our vision and, with them, grounds for doubting the intelligibility of the whole.

This genetic account of human limitations, when supplemented by the author's theory of la vie de l'esprit, provides him with an understanding of the respective methods and achievements of science and philosophy and indicates the way in which modern confusion and contentiousness can be dispelled. His sketch of psychic phenomena is part of an encyclopedic view of the sciences which we cannot discuss, but the essential point for our purposes is that the mark of a well-functioning intelligence is the ability to distinguish apparent contradictions from real ones.23 Complementing intelligence in the life of spirit is love of Truth, and both reinforce each other.24 Thus most insoluble controversies are the combined result of deficiencies in both; for a failure of intelligence makes us see apparent contradictions as real, and love of our own viewpoint rather than of Truth itself prevents the intellectual adventure which would enable us to resolve the contradictions.25 When M. van Mierlo notices that the typical philosopher (Bergson is an exception) looks for certainties about isolated aspects of reality as bases from which to comprehend the whole and that many such grounds may be selected, the relative confusion in philosophy and dogmatic theology is easily explained.26 Oppositions which intelligence might resolve, as it has resolved oppositions of perspective in relativity theory, are hardened by egoism and pride, making the present crisis a matter of something very like original sin.
The scientific spirit, on the other hand, sets out from the whole—but seen vaguely—and aims at making its internal structure precise by the mutual support of many truths which were originally obscured. Since it sets no a priori limits to its purview, it is not so susceptible to distortion by special interests. When sustained by love of Truth, it goes on to a reasonable faith in God, as the principle of the intelligible whole in which sound method believes and as the Truth which the inquirer loves. Such a method, plutôt une attitude intime, permits us to realize our powers, to progress toward the good, and prepares us to receive God's grace. Generalized, it will resolve all social questions.

Here wisdom is virtue in another sense, for wisdom is now a spirit and a "way" and error is attributed to the sin of pride and rejection. M. van Mierlo is not philosophically sophisticated, and it is clearly as oversimple to oppose sin and prescribe reliance on latent "natural" tendencies toward moral regeneration as it is to appeal to canonical doctrines about "nature." But, perhaps unconsciously, he has succeeded in expressing the spirit of a primary tradition—which still flourishes in such mutant forms as idealism, pragmatism, and some versions of existentialism—with more success than some who are confused by their learning.

According to Jean Wahl's The Philosopher's Way, wisdom is also an attitude and a method rather than a doctrine, unless the doctrine is the resolution "to live denying all 'isms,' which are only views—views of something that cannot be viewed." M. Wahl reduces his "crisis" to the dimensions of a need for a revolution in metaphysics, saying that it is time to recognize "the inadequacy of our thoughts to the reality they aim at representing" and to be receptive to the "richness and the inexpressibility of the real." His defects are not those of naïveté but perhaps of oversophistication (he alludes to a dozen or more philosophers, famous or obscure, on each page). But his thought moves in many of the same rhythms as those of his more ambitious, but less erudite, compatriot. Here again is the distrust of all exclusive positions, the synthesis of opposites, humility combined with an endeavor to regain a lost innocence of rapport or immediacy beyond the distortions of mediation. The difference here is in the subtlety with which theoretic considerations are submerged in the aesthetic rather than the moral, so that philosophy is hard to distinguish from poetry.

M. Wahl's dialectic is essentially negative, since its goal as well as its beginning is in immediacy; and existence is prior to essence, as it is now fashionable to say. But, since "we can go toward the immediate only through mediation," he takes us through the whole history of philosophy to prepare for the stage at which "the unceasing dialogue comes to its conclusion in silence." From the beginning the point is made that philosophical categories are images of our own making. Thus the Greek theory of Ideas, he says, was derived from applied mathematics, popular morals, and the arts and crafts—"three human activities, each one admirable," on which was constructed "a kind of metaphor expressing the structure of the world in terms of these activities. But the question may be raised whether it is legitimate for man to start from these activities to interpret nature." Modern thought has become more complex, but man is still homo faber, as Bergson said, ill-suited to the demands of metaphysics.

And so the discussion proceeds down the list of traditional categories from substance to the Absolute; each image must be sup-
plemented by its contrary before both are rejected, having revealed what they could. The comments often seem superficial. They seldom do justice to the virtues of any articulated philosophical position because they are consistently impressionistic rather than systematic. But in this M. Wahl is true to his conception of his function. A difficulty—though not for him—is that in the end there is nothing for a critic to say; for the author can both accept the criticism (since he admits that his own attempts to express the inexpressible are imperfect) and refuse to be pinned down to a definitive assertion (since all formulations are to be discarded).

We have clearly come to a point at which wisdom and nonsense are not distinguishable unless one has followed, instead of read about, the philosopher's way. Positivists would be right in saying that this is utterly noncognitive by their standards; and one easily recalls Aristotle's remark that a person who will not make a definite assertion is no better than a vegetable. But let us not be narrow-minded.

In any case, so far as the broad problem of our discussion is concerned, M. Wahl is above the battle, practicing the virtue of contemplating Being and offering to teach his "way" to wisdom in the only fashion in which it could be taught, by trying to "turn us toward Being," as Plato would say. To continue with Platonic metaphors, we could describe him as having climbed out of the cave; he is treating all arbitrary theses as mere hypotheses rather than as first principles, as a dialectician should; and he may have succeeded in mounting to the Good itself, "beyond all essence in dignity and power." Yet we have some questions still. Can M. Wahl ever get down into the cave again, as Plato's philosophers could? And what of the rigorous discipline which Plato prescribed for the dialectician? One wonders whether this impressionistic discourse may not simply attract lazy bohemians and lyrical aesthetes who will miss the "way" because it seems to demand so little.

In comparison with all the foregoing, Messrs. Adams and Lee behave like the sound and sober-sided professors that they are. The "crisis" is still with us in a diminished form, applying, as in Wahl's case, to the peculiarly metaphysical problem but without his "existential" involvements. Both men are unhappy about the course that philosophy has been taking. Mr. Lee is more emphatic than Mr. Adams in seeing a need for fundamental changes, but neither dreams of anything so drastic as Wahl's revolution.

Mr. Adams' Woodbridge Lectures make a slim volume with a slim but sound point, if we have understood his appeal to "man's metaphysical sense." The point is that it would be a mistake to think of the world as if it were exhausted by what we find when we assume the "observer's perspective" of the sciences. Of course, "all the provinces of existence" can be "corralled" within this naturalistic perspective, "to be known and mastered by the techniques of observation." For such a standpoint knowledge and mind are products and instruments of nature, and empiricism and naturalism coalesce. The observer's perspective, seeking laws among phenomena, deals primarily with "mind's immediate possessions," which lie on its surface. But this perspective leaves out something—the observer: there are principles or presuppositions which, lying "at the back of the mind" like the factors which determine a "climate of opinion," govern any interpretation of what the observer sees. So the mind has an "excursive power" of metaphor in addition to the immediate data of consciousness; and this power is the source of the latter's intelligibility.

Man's metaphysical sense, then, persists in treating experience and nature as contrary rather than synonymous terms, but it would be harder to uncover its activity. Adams and Lee, like Wahl, are sound philosophers who write from the vantage point of another system, that of Kantianism. Both men are critical of the flimsy metaphysics of positivism and Kantianism. Adams is less so, because he sees the limitations of philosophy, the need for 'empirical' knowledge, the "labor of the intellect" and the way to wisdom.

In comparison with Wahl and Adams, the Messrs. Adams and Lee behave like the sound and sober-minded professors that they are. The "crisis" is still with us in a diminished form, applying, as in Wahl's case, to the peculiarly metaphysical problem but without his "existential" involvements. Both men are unhappy about the course that philosophy has been taking. Mr. Lee is more emphatic than Mr. Adams in seeing a need for fundamental changes, but neither dreams of anything so drastic as Wahl's revolution.

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DISCUSSION

would be a mistake to let such an opposition harden into a dualism, for the excursive activity of mind makes the intelligibility of nature a reflection of mind's meanings. Mr. Adams' claims are not exclusive, and he writes in the broad tradition of the dialecticians. His plea for keeping alive a sense of another dimension of reality to supplement the flatness of the observer's perspective is compatible with such different views as Kant's doctrine of reason as legislative and Augustine's account of passing from an order perceived by the senses through an intellectual order to God. And in its modest way it is wise.

The late Otis Lee's study of *Existence and Inquiry* raises many complicated questions for students of the history of philosophy since the seventeenth century which we cannot examine, and it is more definitely addressed to an audience of professionals than are any of the other books on our list. But, aside from the fact that Mr. Lee calls both for the now familiar "reorientation in philosophy," requiring "a radical change in our conceptions of inquiry and truth," and for a shift of emphasis from the epistemological and abstractly analytical to the existential point of view which connects him in various ways with Wild, Wahl, and Adams, he explicitly introduces a new emphasis which was becoming apparent in some of the other authors and is increasingly important in recent philosophy: the concern with history.

We are not presented with a philosophy of history, but with a sort of historical philosophy in the sense that history functions here as a source of principles in philosophy. It determines the philosopher's problems and, to a large extent, his solutions. Moreover, its concrete character, revealing what we have become, provides the best basis for deciding what to do. History then may be a source of both theoretical and practical wisdom, though Mr. Lee is less occupied with exploring its bearing on broadly practical problems than with showing that it requires philosophers to concentrate on the "concrete entity" in place of "law, uniformity, and abstract order."18

That history sets a philosopher's problems is illustrated by reference to the problem of inquiry itself. Only when the status of knowledge is questioned, either because of internal conflicts or because its results and applications are challenged from the outside, does inquiry itself become the concern of inquiry.2 Both kinds of challenge are all too evident now (here is the consciousness of crisis again), but they have been more or less active since the seventeenth century—a fact which accounts for the predominance of methodological questions in modern philosophy. Instead of "method," however, Mr. Lee prefers to discuss "inquiry," with its complex references to activities and processes, to subject matter, to presuppositions and ends, as well as to methods in the narrow sense of techniques. In fact, the reduction of the problem of inquiry to that of method alone is one of the reasons why we tend to reduce the object of inquiry (existence) to the object of knowledge or existence-as-known.2 But co-ordinate with recent views of inquiry there is a "contemporary view of reality" as concrete process which has also been determined historically, but to which conceptions of inquiry are inadequate.4 The problem, then, is to bring the conceptions of existence and inquiry into harmony; and grounds for a solution can be found by a historical study of modern philosophy, showing how the present situation came about. The body of the book consists of that study.

At the beginning of modern philosophy there was a common conception of inquiry as an activity of analysis and synthesis, ac-

cording to which one analyzes crude experience in search of clear and self-evident elements, and then reinterprets the world by a synthesis constructed from the elements. Such a view is common to "rationalists" and "empiricists" alike, who share a criterion of "the true as the clear and distinct or the intrinsically intelligible" and agree that "to understand is to reduce things to terms of clear and orderly experience." Mr. Lee’s selection of "analysis" as a main heading for his argument is not only refreshing after the overworked opposition of empiricists to rationalists; it also reflects the historical basis of his discussion, since "analysis" is characteristic of an epoch.

This “philosophy of self-evidence” was sound in its conviction that “reality is given and that its nature can be apprehended” as a structure. But it did not do justice to the “relational” features of process and becoming, and there was a tendency for ideas—as sense-data or as logical concepts—to become separated from existence, generating endless epistemological problems. The conception of inquiry as “dialectic,” therefore, arose as an attempt to deal with the dualities of being and becoming and of subject and object, and it had its genesis in the discovery of a dynamic character in the life of mind and society. It, too, was sound, not only in its insight that reality is process but because systematic thinking is always dialectical. But dialectic could not solve the problem of historical relativism: How can man “understand reality when he participates in its process?”

Pragmatism, accordingly, is the third term in this dialectical progression of concepts of inquiry. It is “an attempt to combine the logical clarity of analysis with the recognition that reality is process” and that the inquirer’s perspective is involved in it. But pragmatism fails to bring its methods to bear upon present existence. Instead, it oscillates between a genetic method of accounting for the present in terms of the past and an experimental method which dissolves judgments about present existence into predictions of future consequences of experimental operations. What is needed, therefore, is an attack upon the existential object of inquiry, which is not exhausted by the object of knowledge, in spite of Dewey’s warnings against bothering about “anecedent reality.”

This is as far as we can go with Mr. Lee. Mr. Tillich will have much to say about his fundamental contention that the inquirer is enmeshed in historical perspectives; and we have sketched his conception and use of history as a source of wisdom. It seems, however, that he has barely indicated the nature of his problems: If history is so fundamental, some principles for dealing with it should be identified. And what of the proposed metaphysics of present existence? Finally, there is a historical point of a different kind to be made, recalling our doubts about Mr. Wild and applying to any treatment of philosophy in terms of isms. By reducing his “realistic” philosophers to a common denominator, Mr. Wild overlooked important distinctions which they all made in different ways. There are grounds for suspecting that among Mr. Lee’s analysts, dialecticians, and pragmatists—who are not examined individually—a different kind of historical method might discover various special ways of avoiding the shortcomings of their respective isms. If so, Mr. Lee’s argument would evaporate. In any event, an implicit philosophy of history seems to have been at work here. Unfortunately, Mr. Lee did not live to make it explicit.

IV

"History became the central problem of my theology and philosophy because of the historical reality as I found it when I returned from the first World War," writes Paul Tillich in his Introduction to The Protestant Era, a volume of his essays now assembled and, when necessary, translated by
instead, it suggests its historical orientation, it does little to indicate the book’s scope, which includes all the questions of our discussion and introduces theological considerations of a new sort. Unlike Lee, Tillich finds that the formulation and selection of philosophic problems are subject to historical circumstances, as nearly everyone would agree. But, while Lee appeals to the history of problems about existence and inquiry in order to decide what philosophers should do or be concerned about (because history is generally the best guide to what is to be done), Tillich’s problem is history itself, with all the practical (he would say “existential”) commitments that it requires of men as historical beings.

Mr. Tillich’s method does not make use of literal distinctions, and his argument echoes “the mystical vagueness of the classic philosophical German” in spite of his testimony that acquaintance with English has improved his perception of ambiguities; but his main principles are clear enough. Chief among these is his “radical and universal interpretation” of the Protestant principle of justification by faith. If a sinner is justified by his unconditional faith in the norm which declares him a sinner, why is not a conscientious doubter also justified, so that even “he who seriously denies God”—i.e., some particular conception of God—“affirms him” as the principle of divinity against which the rejected conception is measured? Consequently, “if you are desperate about the meaning of life, the seriousness of your despair is the expression of the meaning in which you are still living. This unconditional seriousness is the expression of the divine in the experience of utter separation from it.”

Furthermore, his description of his philosophy as “philosophical theology” takes on an unsuspected meaning. The subject matter of theology is now “the unconditional”; but “the unconditional is a quality, not a being. It characterizes that which is our ultimate and, consequently, unconditional concern, whether we call it ‘God’ or ‘Being as such’ or the ‘True as such.’ . . . It would be a complete mistake to understand the unconditional as a being the existence of which can be discussed.” In these terms philosophy and theology must always be inseparable because any form of culture without a “religious” concern would be sterile. Academic philosophy has indeed become so, either as logical positivism, “prohibiting philosophy from dealing with any problem which concerns us seriously”; as epistemology, “forver sharpening the knife of thought but never cutting”; or as mere history of philosophy, repeating old opinions without

* Tillich, op. cit., pp. xiv f.
commitment. Theological philosophy, then, is existential in Kierkegaard's sense. But, on the other hand, a theology distinct from a philosophy which mediates the natural and the divine speaks of God as "a being beside others, ... the highest being but not being itself, ... a merciful tyrant limited in power who may concern us very much but not ultimately." Hence philosophy and theology are "convergent as far as both are existential and theoretical at the same time. They are divergent as far as philosophy is basically theoretical and theology is basically existential."

So far some might object that Mr. Tillich has remained a theologian—which he says he could not have done without reinterpreting the Protestant principle—only at the expense of reducing theology to existential philosophy. But there is another dimension to this, even though its integration with principles elaborated in this book is not made clear: in accordance with the historic fact of Christian revelation, the philosophical theologian "tries to show that Jesus as the Christ is the logos" sought by philosophy.

The application of the Protestant principle to problems of history requires something like "works" to supplement "faith" or concern; for "the key to the interpretation of history is historical activity." It also requires the elaboration of subsidiary concepts. One of these is that of the "kairos," which "describes the moment in which the eternal breaks forth into the temporal and the temporal is prepared to receive it. What happened in the one unique kairos, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, i.e., as the center of history, may happen again in the process of time, creating centers of lesser importance on which the periodization of history is dependent." To paraphrase Plato, it appears that history is the moving image of eternity. However that may be, such a time in which a new vision of the logos occurs is "theonomous" in that "the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action." But there is always an opposed tendency toward "autonomy," or independence of the unconditional basis of all culture, which may take the form of self-sufficient rationalism or secularism. Finally, attempts to overcome autonomy lead to "heteronomous" impositions of an external law, religious or secular, upon culture. It appears as the dogma of papal infallibility or as a regime of terror, whether imposed by absolute churches or absolute states.

This dialectically related triad of concepts helps to specify the application of the Protestant principle, which by itself makes it difficult to differentiate the properly religious from its imperfect forms or from its contrary; for, while it is always true that "religion is the substance of culture and culture the expression of religion," there are distinctions to be made. The protest of Marxism is religious, but it is not theonomous; and the same is true of the seriousness of the scientific empiricist. These are rather manifestations of autonomy, drawing on the capital of a previous theonomy. On the other hand, neo-Thomism and Marxism, as orthodoxies proclaiming a definitive appearance of truth among men, are heteronomous; and both are essentially idolatrous, violating the Protestant principle that, while the relative must always be "open to" the unconditional, it can never be more than an image of it.

So history moves from theonomy to theonomy, from kairos to kairos, with degradations in between. We are now in a period in which autonomous secularism has used up its religious inheritance and a sense of meaninglessness is creeping over the world. Catholic heteronomy has no future, and the "demonic" heteronomies of fascism and sovietism still threaten. The world, then, is ready for a new kairos with its attendant theonomy. Mr. Tillich suspects that Protestant principle of theonomy is in the making. If so, it may help to set the world aright again.

51 Ibid., p. 89.
52 Ibid., p. 88.
53 Ibid., p. 92.
54 Ibid., p. x.
55 Ibid., p. xix.
56 Ibid., p. xvi.
57 Ibid., p. xvii.
constantism will not be its vehicle, since the Protestant churches have been false to their principle by becoming orthodox and allying themselves with secular ideologies and interests. But, if so, this means that “the Protestant Era” will be condemned by the Protestant principle.

Where, then, will the new manifestation of the logos appear? Mr. Tillich makes no predictions, but he looks to the proletarians, in whom the experience of despair and meaninglessness has created the kind of concern which might issue in a new faith. His own extensive political activity has been in behalf of religious socialism, dedicated to directing the basically religious protest of the masses along lines which will be open to a genuine theonomy. But he does not pretend to define the outlines of the new kairos.

If we now pause and look back over our list of books written in the pursuit of wisdom, we can see that in his prophetic and romantic way Mr. Tillich has sufficient scope to comment on all of them and that, to a certain extent, our estimates agree with his. Mr. Beer and Mr. Wild have tried to deal with disorder and defeatism by heteronomous devices, submitting doctrines about the world and God “as a being among others” as principles of decision and concern. We agree with Tillich that these efforts are misplaced. But such a judgment seems to require a less apocalyptic vision than his and to be independent of a theological analysis of history. Our principle that no special theory of being can be an ultimate principle of action may be considered a manifestation of the Protestant principle; but it seems to be just a matter of clarity in our ideas and to have been more artfully stated by various philosophies, among which Tillich’s version recalls Plato’s view that the realm of becoming can only mirror the transcendent unity of Being, Truth, and Goodness.

Van Mierlo and Wahl fare better under the judgment of the Protestant principle; for both concentrate upon the spirit, avoiding heteronomy and what Tillich sometimes calls “objectivist” errors. His criticism of them, so far as the crisis in history is concerned, would be that, since “historical activity” is the key to the problems of our time, presentations of “attitudes” and “ways” are not enough. We should agree, so far as the criticism applies at all. It does seem sensible to say that wisdom in making commitments about questions of culture and community depends in part upon experience with such activities, as it also depends in part upon not confusing them with problems about nature and the existence of God. So M. van Mierlo is naive in simply recommending a moralized scientific spirit. But, since M. Wahl did not address himself directly to “the world-historical situation,” he must be judged on other grounds. He is existentially concerned about being itself, and his work betrays a kind of piety about existence which makes him accuse us of idolatry when we take our images of things too seriously. But this would be another expression of the Protestant principle!

All the same, the main proposition which can be found in Wahl’s book—that what exists is always more than what it is known to be—can be expressed literally without calling upon the Protestant principle. Moreover, it occurs in some form in every philosophy worth mentioning. It appeared when Mr. Adams cautioned against taking “the observer’s perspective” too seriously, as well as when he described “mind’s meanings” as metaphors and hence not literal transcriptions of reality. Finally, Mr. Lee paid his respects to it explicitly, both noting that we are limited to certain perspectives and criticizing tendencies in recent philosophy to equate the real object of inquiry with the object as we know it. Indeed, all these men can be made to pass Tillich’s test, for they are piously concerned lest we take any relative aspect of being for being itself.

However, the test seems to be hardly sufficient and perhaps Tillich would not intend it to be—for each must be criticized on more specific grounds: Wahl for not providing a discipline for his lyrical “way”; Adams for the extreme modesty of his point when seen without its literary clothing; and
Lee for lack of clarity about the principles of his discussion.

So what, then, shall we say of Mr. Tillich? For one thing, the Protestant principle tells us something about all absolute norms—that they must be absolute. But are there not differences in their application and interpretation? Otherwise, he has presented a very lofty message in the language of a German philosopher and with the drama of the mysteries. But the romantic trappings seem to be unnecessary and to obscure the message. And the advice that he gives for concrete problems seems quite independent of the grandeur of his conceptions: We shall better understand our crisis if we are not frivolous but concerned even in defeat, if we are active in the affairs of the community, and if we are not doctrinaire. We should not expect any existing formula or institution to be absolute or to provide the organizing principle of the future, but we should be sensitive to new possibilities—i.e., to the kairos. As for philosophers in the narrow sense, they should be alive to the problems of their times and should avoid pedantry in doctrine and method.

These are undoubtedly wise sayings. People like us, besieged by sophists who have been wired for sound, may require much study and effort before we are sure of them. But do they require any special revelation? Or should we say, in Tillich’s terms, that the lasting truth which they express so schematically that they seem trivial must be forever elaborated in new forms and that history is the stage on which the vitality of each reformulation appears and fades?
VIRTUE AND KNOWLEDGE: THE VIEW OF PROFESSOR POLANYI

FRANK H. KNIGHT

In his Riddell Memorial Lectures for 1946 at the University of Durham and in a pamphlet of the same date on academic freedom, Michael Polanyi, the distinguished physical chemist, now professor of social philosophy at the University of Manchester, presents a novel and interesting treatment of the ancient problem named in our title. The exposition is appealing and the substance contains important truth. At the same time, the argument is, in the reviewer's opinion, seriously fallacious, and the partial truth in it particularly justifies thorough critical examination.

The same theme, in an abstract view, has been made familiar in America during the last two generations, in which thinking about moral and social theory has been dominated by the pragmatism of Peirce and James and especially, more recently, by that of John Dewey. This thesis is the identity of problems and methodology in natural science and in the disciplines concerned with man and society. But between Polanyi and our scientistic-positivist-utilitarian sociologists and political writers there is a contrast more important than the affinity. Polanyi goes at the identification in the opposite way about, "from the other end." Instead of hammering at society and its spokesmen because they do not solve all our problems by adopting and applying scientific method, the former chemist tells us that the procedure of science is that already in use in dealing with social matters. His junction is, in effect, to go on conscientiously practicing free discussion and to put faith in it, specifically in two main principles which underlie the process—fairness and tolerance (Lect., p. 54). We are to trust and be patient, quit worrying or stirring up trouble, and all will be well; God's in his Heaven, all's right with the world—or will progressively be put right. Science has demonstrated its capacity to solve problems, and we need only understand that those of the social order are of the same kind. Unfortunately, both views alike have the strong appeal of the intellectual get-rich-quick scheme, easy solutions for hard problems, and would likely lead to a resort to the sword of political pow-

1 Our reference to "God" is not dragged in, as will appear later. This article has a task large enough in criticizing Polanyi's position; it could not attempt, in addition, a detailed comparison with Dewey's views. Of course, Dewey's technique would be different—getting "facts" and attempting to arrive at "laws," where Polanyi would think and argue—if the two really mean what they seem to say! Polanyi cannot really think the procedure suggested by his argument is that of science; he did not achieve his standing as a chemist in that way, and the fact sets a difficulty of interpretation. How far Dewey holds the naive positivistic position which his influence has promoted is also a question. Refutation of this is the chief merit of Polanyi's work. For an illustration of positivistic sociology—a good bad example—see Can Science Save Us? by George A. Lundberg (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), reviewed in an article by the present writer in the Journal of Political Economy, December, 1947. A brief statement by Dewey is his paper, "Authority and Social Change," in the volume, Authority and the Individual (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937); a fuller statement in Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937). The student will, of course, consult Dewey's Logic and voluminous philosophical writings. Dewey and his followers deserve credit at least for "yeoman service" in combating one type of pseudo-explanations, in terms of a theistic or teleological world-view; on this issue Polanyi seems to take both sides.
er to cut the knot of a political impasse, which the author thinks he is combating.

I

As to the nature of scientific method, Polanyi's thesis is valid, up to a point; and it is of the utmost importance to have it stated, to students of man and society, from a source that speaks with authority. The procedure of natural science is not merely observation and inference, looking to prediction and control. Its problems are also value-problems; they call for a large amount of creative imagination and contain a large "moral," even quasi-religious, element. Science also requires loyalty to tradition and respect for authority, even submission. Perhaps the author's greatest service to moral science is his emphasis on the 'eternally provisional' nature of truth, in the modern world-view (Lect., p. 29). He might go further in driving this home, against the idea of eternal and immutable truth, dogma revealed long ago and once for all, to be accepted by a moral choice between virtue and sin. What is now sacred, under the name of truth, is not particular "truths" but the honest pursuit of truth and critical judgment by standards applied in open court before all competent and unbiased judges.

But the effect of the argument is to carry the assimilation of science to morals so far as to obscure the essential problem in the latter field and virtually to deny its existence. The author nowhere faces up to the simple fact that the situation in social discussion presents a glaring contrast to the unforced and phenomenal progress of science; and, of course, he throws no light on how or why the situation comes about. There must be underlying differences to account for the contrast; we cannot draw the implied moral that it is all a mistake—or should we say a sin?—that society need only trust, and not press for solutions faster than free discussion spontaneously establishes agreement. That way lies chaos—social, if not individual, madness.

It is true that there is no explicit identification, and differences are conceded; but they are not followed out to their implications. On one side, observation and experimentation in science are mentioned, but only to minimize their role. On the other, it is admitted that compulsion has more place in moral and political decisions than it has in science. On the first point, we are told at the very outset (Lect., p. 7, first page of text) that no law of nature can possibly be derived from any mass of data "by definitive operations." And again: "The part played by new observations and experiment in the progress of discovery in science is usually over-estimated," and "objective experience cannot compel a decision... between the magical and the naturalistic interpretation of daily life, or... the scientific and the theological interpretation of nature... the decision can be found only by a process of arbitration in which alternative forms of satisfaction will be weighed in the balance" (ibid., p. 14. Is he a hedonist?). And, near the end of the Lectures (p. 62): "The method of disbelieving every proposition which cannot be verified by definitely prescribed operations would destroy all belief in natural science... in fact, belief in truth and the love of truth itself which is the condition of all free thought." And, perhaps most important of all: "The scientist's conviction that science works is no better... than the astrologist's belief in horoscopes or the fundamentalist's belief in the letter of the Bible. A belief always works in the eyes of the believer" (p. 47).3

3I quote at length, both to put the author's meaning beyond danger of misrepresentation and in the hope that the truth in what he says may register with some of our psychological and sociological worshipers of "science," who make it so much simpler than it is, in its own proper domain. The same thought is repeated many times in the Lectures, with various shades of meaning. On p. 11 it is denied that "our daily experience compels us... to accept certain natural laws as true." To believe that "generalizations such as 'all men must die' or 'the sun sheds daylight'... follow from experience without any intervention of an intuitive faculty... only shows that we incline to regard our own particular convictions as inescapable. For these generalizations are quite commonly denied by primitive peoples," and "they are of normal intelligence... [and] not only find their views wholly consistent with the facts they hold true.

Another supply of meaning is the "fact" that the apprehension of a process can turn a "shut" process into one that is "open"; and that, between the range of operations, there is a range of perception. We are not led to rule out any phenomenon on the definition of it.
What the author says is true, "up to a point," and vitally important. A belief "works," satisfies, as long as it is held. (Approximately! People do cling to beliefs, or professions, after they "know" they are false and no longer carry them into action.) But typically there comes a point! And our author does not face up to the question as to why world-views change. It would seem to follow that they could not. In fact, it does not take primitive peoples—or the civilized but "pre-scientific"—long to be convinced by the various "arguments" of Europeans that the latter's interpretation of nature is "superior" to their own. And the Westerners themselves are wont to lament the readiness of Orientals, and even primitives, to leap to conclusions. Verification, even though usually more subject to rules than discovery, rests ultimately on mental powers which go beyond the application of any definite rules.

and science on which his heart is set. He does, indeed, recognize the question of why scientists agree, the grounds of the "remarkable" consensus that prevails among them (Lect., p. 26). The second lecture, "Authority and Conscience," is on and around this theme, besides adversions in the other two. But the discussion is far from satisfactory. The answer to the question is found in loyalty to a tradition, with a general authority as its guardian, though we are told that the "scientific conscience" is "the ultimate arbiter" (Lect., pp. 41 and 53). The relations are not made clear. We glimpse a struggle between will power, argument, and conscience to pass on intuition (p. 53). The content of the tradition seems to be simply freedom of conscience. And the role of authority is ambiguous. On page 49 it is "inherently restricted to the guardianship of the premises of freedom"; but on pages 35–36 it must also deny freedom to cranks, swindlers, and bunglers (also pp. 58, 65). Sometimes it seems to be just a brute fact that scientists are all loyal to the same tradition; but elsewhere authority plays a large role, through control of publication, of access to laboratories, teaching appointments, etc. (pp. 35, 40, and elsewhere).

As to freedom of conscience itself, the individual has no choice; it is forced upon him. Its "origin" is in his primary education, like learning to talk and acquiring the naturalistic world-view (pp. 28, 29, 31). Of course, the second lecture, "Authority and Conscience," is on and around this theme, besides adversions in the other two. The answer to the question is found in loyalty to a tradition, with a general authority as its guardian, though we are told that the "scientific conscience" is "the ultimate arbiter" (Lect., pp. 41 and 53). The relations are not made clear. We glimpse a struggle between will power, argument, and conscience to pass on intuition (p. 53). The content of the tradition seems to be simply freedom of conscience. And the role of authority is ambiguous. On page 49 it is "inherently restricted to the guardianship of the premises of freedom"; but on pages 35–36 it must also deny freedom to cranks, swindlers, and bunglers (also pp. 58, 65). Sometimes it seems to be just a brute fact that scientists are all loyal to the same tradition; but elsewhere authority plays a large role, through control of publication, of access to laboratories, teaching appointments, etc. (pp. 35, 40, and elsewhere).

As to freedom of conscience itself, the individual has no choice; it is forced upon him. Its "origin" is in his primary education, like learning to talk and acquiring the naturalistic world-view (pp. 28, 29, 31). Of course, the opposite compulsion has prevailed over most of the globe and most of its history. We are given glimpses of the change (esp. Lect. III, Sec. III, pp. 60 ff.) but are told nothing about its causes or reasons. "Conversion" is mentioned, as a process by which premises are shifted (p. 53), and the effort to convert others is explicitly sanctioned (p. 67); but it is not described or brought into relation with intuition, argument, will power, and conscience. There is no indication that conversion is a social phenomenon or that the author would so designate the replacement of the religious world-view by the naturalistic in modern times.

What is said of science applies to all so-
cial beliefs and patterns. "The premisses [which] will guide conscience . . . in a free society [are to be found] as in the case of the premisses of science . . . underlying the art of free discussion, transmitted by a tradition of civic liberties and embodied in the institutions of democracy" (p. 53). "When a child is born to a national community the Social Contract is imposed on it by force. . . . The whole heritage of free institutions will descend upon [him] and confirm [him] in these traditional obligations. They will thus be secured by compulsion, exercised by public opinion either directly or through . . . legislation" (p. 58). It is thus that our community is "pledged to seek the truth" and "must grant freedom to science as one form of truth." And for this reason, "such adherence as it can gain by fair and tolerant discussion is its rightful share [my italics]." And, in general, institutional action remains rightful, so long as it is based on democratic decisions swayed by open persuasion (pp. 58–59). Decisions binding on all, by officials elected under open persuasion, are likely to be a far cry from individual freedom, such as prevails in science, notably when they "involve assent to social action." However, "this is the ultimate point to which we can trace the roots of our conviction expressed in affirming any particular scientific proposition as true" (p. 59; italics in original). It is surely evident that, while the tradition of the free conscience and some of the techniques of discussion (especially some language, rules for conducting assemblies, some of the control of publication, etc.) are common to science and government, the former has in addition other essential features, including the "practice of experimental proof" mentioned above.

To see that the two fields differ sharply, we need only compare the last few paragraphs above with the picture that we get at the beginning of Lecture II. Here "the premisses which underlie science fall into two classes"; free discussion is not one of them, and its premises and technique are not mentioned. They are, first, "the general assumptions . . . which constitute the natu-ralist . . . outlook" and, second, "the more particular assumptions underlying the process of scientific discovery and its verification." What is there in the social field corresponding to these last? This is the great unanswered—and unasked—question.

The author goes on to describe the role of the authority of the teacher or master over the student or apprentice. But then he turns to emphasize the necessity, for understanding science, of "penetrating" to the reality described by science, whereby "the authority to which the student submits tends to eliminate its own functions by establishing direct contact [with] the reality of nature" (p. 31). As the student approaches maturity, his own intuition of reality and his conscience take over responsibility for his beliefs in place of authority. What the author is insisting upon throughout is some sort of balance of the three forces—individual intuition of reality, tradition, and authority. The conception of tradition and authority and their roles is very ambiguous. Within limits that is inevitable, but it needs to be recognized to be minimized, instead of making now one, now the other (of all three), predominant. Crucial is the fact that the only ground given for believing that science tells us truth about reality is that its "vast growth in the last 300 years proves massively that new aspects of reality are constantly being added to those known before" (Lect., p. 10). This implies that a considerable growth of any sort of tradition proves it to embody contact with some reality or some aspect of reality. We are given no analysis of grounds of belief, particularly of the relation between intellect and emotion, or between either and our eyes and hands! We are repeatedly told that it is a matter of choice between "types of mental satisfaction." The word "conscience" covers all (all that is not covered by "force," tradition, and authority) without discussion of the kind of faculty that conscience is (but it is neither will-power nor argument, Lect., p. 53, as already cited).

At one point emotion seems to be rejected as a source of knowledge or assigned a very
DISCUSSION

It is to be noted that, as we are repeatedly told, the rules of research, like those of other higher arts, cannot usefully be codified but are embodied in practice alone (Lect., p. 19 and elsewhere).

As to mathematics, the reviewer pretends to no special competence but simply presumes to make a comment. The "high priori" character of mathematical reasoning (and logical, if there is a difference) is commonly exaggerated, if it is not an out-and-out fallacy. There are two schools of thought among the "experts" themselves, and "the truth" surely lies with those (I believe the smaller group) who hold that mathematics is a language for describing and reasoning about the world of ordinary reality. Anyhow, it is clear that, up to very high levels of abstraction (if something more is ultimately involved), mathematical propositions can be verified empirically, by counting and measuring, to any degree of accuracy and generality thought worth the expense. (And it would be merely dogmatic, if meaningful at all, to assert their "absolute" validity.) But no such verification is ever possible for any statement about motivated behavior—nearly the whole field of social phenomena.

For an exposition of the "true" view of mathematics see the essay, "Intelligence and Mathematics," by Harold Chapman Brown, in Creative Intelligence (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1937); also (as I gather from reviews) Mathematics for the Million, by Lancelot Hogben (London and New York, 1937).
tianity, abruptly ending in his conversion, which is thus identified with scientific research and discovery. Solving moral and social problems is still to be added, to state the author’s central thesis, and to these we now turn.

II

Polanyi offers little concrete treatment of the society side of the relation; he writes mostly about science and faith or science and such things as intuition of reality, conscience, freedom, free discussion, tradition, and authority. It seems that no definition of society or of a social problem, or discussion of procedure in this field, is called for beyond what is said about science and elaboration of the assertion of parallelism. (Lecture III, “Dedication or Servitude,” is chiefly a sermon on faith in the reality of ideals, based on this thesis.) Some approach to concreteness may be found in Section III of Lecture II (pp. 42-48). The author begins by restating his thesis that “it is true also of all complex creative activities ... carried on beyond the lifetime of individuals” as it is of science, that “it can exist only because its premises can be embodied in a tradition ... held in common by a community.” “We may think for example of the law and of the Protestant Christian religion,” and he proceeds to “include such fields as law and religion in [his] further discussion” (p. 42).5

5 Two pages later he “illustrates” by “the fields of law, religion, politics, manners, etc.”, but the discussion fits the first statement. The law will be considered later, in relation to more specific statements in the academic freedom pamphlet. The identification of religion with Protestant Christianity is significant (beyond its being his own “tradition”). He makes it the basis for contrasting “two types of authority, one laying down general presuppositions, the other imposing conclusions” (p. 43). It is surely fantastic to treat Protestantism as a unit, and the difference between churches is clearly one of degree and of practically all degrees. Further, for the Roman Catholic and larger Protestant bodies it is less a matter of their claims than of the will (sincerity?) and effective organization to enforce conformity.

The author goes on to refer to two kinds of rules: first, “the vague rules embodied in the art of scientific research,” which leave a margin for personal judgment and can be transmitted only by teaching the practice which embodies them; and, second, “strict rules, like those of the multiplication table.” But I do not see any significant correspondence with his two types of authority—or see where the two types of rules fit into the system. Surely, a more important distinction would be that between substantive and procedural law and, still more, that between law, as any form of imperative, and scientific law, stating some factual generalization (conditional imperatives are something else, perhaps intermediate, in some sense).

6 On this same page (42, italics in original) we are told that “such processes of creative renewal [law and religion, like science] always imply an appeal from a tradition as it is to a tradition as it ought to be.” The commonplace question: Is an “ought-to-be” a reality, in at all the same sense as an “is”? is not answered when the author goes on: “That is to a spiritual reality embodied in tradition and transcending it,” with explicit reference to science.

The essential thesis of the whole argument is stated just at the end of the preceding section. A “community of consciences jointly rooted in the same ideals recognized by all ... becomes an embodiment of these ideals and a living demonstration of their reality” (p. 43; my italics). Surely, if ideals are “real,” it must be in a distinctive sense of the work, or what do we mean by “realizing” our ideals? But the main question is: What is the significance of the boundless differences and antagonisms between innumerable communities with disparate norms, legal, moral, political, religious, and other kinds? And of their changes, appearances, and disappearances? And, especially, of the contrast between this bewildering diversity and flux and the situation presented by science? Surely, a new meaning must be given to “reality” if it is to be all things to all men, and change from year to year, or if its main “aspects” are to be have so. And there is the logical difficulty already mentioned: the institutions and practices of democracy have been put forward as the “art” in which the “reality” of free society is embodied. Surely, they are at most a procedure for discovering some reality—if lawmaking can be thought of as an attempt to do that! Then, if the organization of science is called a “democracy”—which is more apparent, the similarity of the differences, between research and
III

For the most part, the pamphlet on the foundations of academic freedom does not bear directly on the titular theme of the Lectures (and of this article)—the methodologies of science and social discussion. The main burden is further "propaganda" for freedom in science (roughly pp. 3-11; it is a central theme of the Lectures also), followed by a "generalization of these considerations to scholarship in general" (pp. 11-18). However, a look at the more concrete and practical essay will illuminate the philosophical problem, especially since intellectual liberty is the cornerstone of free society, inseparable from freedom of action.

Polanyi's discussion of freedom in science is built around the analogy of a number of people attempting to co-operate in solving a jigsaw puzzle. But if this crude analogy is examined, it will bring out the vast difference between scientific and moral problems rather than the limited resemblance. The author concedes "something profoundly different" (p. 8), in that the puzzle is known to have a definite solution and a new piece either fits into a particular gap or fails to fit in the most obvious fashion, while in science this is not so. But "this is only to be taken as a warning to be careful in using this analogy." We may pass over his discussion as to whether science has "a comprehensive task," since it is the definiteness of each step that is important, and here the author exaggerates the difference between the puzzle analogy and science. A little modification will clarify the point. Our puzzle may start with a given central section, to be built out in all directions. And it may have indefinitely many pieces, some of which will fit and others not; and more than one may fit at a given point, but only one make it

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1 Some exception may be made for a brief reference to the law, introduced as a comparison (see below).

2 Scientists do not show much concern about the possibility (hope or danger) of one day finding out all there is to know—or whether the result would be heaven or hell. It is a profoundly important question, but outside the scope of this review!
possible to go on later, so that some occasional tearing-up and rebuilding will be necessary. Still, the jigsaw puzzle will grow by accretion, by steps that are not in dispute, and simultaneous independent contributions can be made. But cultural progress, moral or aesthetic and political, has more the form of qualitative change; it involves change in the norms themselves by which results are judged. Of course, scientific work is not so mechanical as a puzzle-solving analogy suggests, but the difference from moral problems is vast. Another major difference is that scientific problems can wait, where social issues must often be solved in some way, "now," no backtracking possible. Otherwise they may "solve themselves," disastrously, or it may require carefully considered action to keep that from happening. And this irreversibility in time results in the vital, if familiar, difference, the near-exclusion of experiment.10

10 Actually, not much of this has happened—i.e., has happened since the "positive" approach replaced dogma and metaphysics in the study of nature. (A step which Polanyi's argument glazes over, or even points to reversing, though this is clearly impossible.) This was a change in the norms (referred to in the text below); it was a change in the conception of truth, not a scientific advance but a cultural, moral-religious, revolution. The greatest scientific discoveries mostly leave old knowledge intact as far as it goes, merely showing it to have been incomplete or imprecise, and changing the interpretation.

Experiencing with human life is not merely repugnant sentimentally or ethically. An experiment must not itself produce a serious permanent change. The typical outcome of a laboratory experiment on an animal is a "negative result" and a "dead dog." But there are always plenty more dogs, similar enough to the defunct specimen; and this is not true of human beings, in the qualities on which we crave knowledge. Apart from injury, a "subject" is usually changed, preventing repetition of an experiment. And the moral considerations themselves are complex. Human beings would usually have to be coerced or deceived, in contrast with physical objects (and in part with animals, up to the highest). This alone is considered an "injury," and "wrong," and may, besides, influence the results. The "medical experiments" of the Nazis were of negligible scientific import, apart from other unsatisfactory aspects. In a sense, human life is highly experimental; but deliberate and intelligent experimenting is very difficult and dangerous. (To treat social problems as knowledge problems at all, as Polanyi does, is to beg perhaps the most serious philosophic question; about this, "more later"—but not much, in this review.)

Now, to begin with, he at once pounces upon a bad example from the United States and, two pages later, he "rubs it in" with an invidious comparison with named European countries. The example is a pamphlet on the dairy industry and the war effort, published by Iowa State College, at Ames, in 1943. Some statements about restrictions on margarine provoked a reaction from the head of a private farm organization. No official action or threat of action was involved, and the leader of the protest was ousted from his job. It is evidently too much to expect a scientist to get the facts and state them as they were, in such a case (if he said anything); anyhow, what the professor says "actually happened quite recently in Iowa" is utterly different from what actually did actually happen. The facts have long been public, but they would not give a European intellectual an occasion to make an example of American barbarism, in promoting "the interests of learning and truth." (For obvious historical reasons, the British elite assume a natural and vested right to treat Americans as rustic relations or backward children spoiled by unearned material success; however, it does not seem to interfere much with pleasant personal relations, or even—despite aggravating circumstances—with political cooperation. The subject has been entertainingly discussed by Dixon Wecter, in an article entitled "Dying in Southern California," in Pacific Spectator for December, 1948.) The matter is not so extraneous here as it may seem, since the fundamental issue is the conflict between truth and other interests and values. Viewing the example as purely hypothetical, without reference to authenticity or other unpleasant aspects, it may serve as concrete focus of attention in showing that the argument is irrelevant and untenable.
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considering where their interests are likely to conflict. A state might, of course, support science simply as a branch of culture or entertainment, as was done for music and drama in some European cities in other days. Perhaps this applies to elementary education, but the reasons here are complex and various. It is more likely, looking at modern history, to want to suppress science, for religious reasons, and the "cultural elite" commonly oppose it as vulgar and materialistic. The main fact, certainly, is that governments support scientific education, and research (two things), from economic and military motives (and health, if that is not included under economic). Anyhow, Professor Polanyi surely does not expect anybody to support an activity without exercising some direction; he (or it) would not if he could, and could not if he wanted to.

A decision to support must be selective. Choice of lines for support will be combined, variously and unanalyzably, with choice among persons, on grounds of "confidence," as is true in every delegation of power to an agent or representative, by any principal. Further, the government could not turn funds over to "science" unless scientists were (like itself) organized to act effectively as a unit. But such an organization would probably destroy the freedom of the individual scientist about as effectively as would a unit. But such an organization would probably destroy the freedom of the individual scientist about as effectively as would direct administration by government. And, still further, a unitary organization of all scientists (co-opting its own membership) would have such power in the world of today as virtually to make it the real government—if other vocations would allow it to do so. All this applies specifically to the restrictions on margarine; about which the scientist has no more to say than anyone else. All this applies specifically to the restrictions on margarine; about which the scientist has no more to say than anyone else. All this applies specifically to the restrictions on margarine; about which the scientist has no more to say than anyone else.

The serious error in Polanyi's reasoning, at this point, is the assumption that everyone knows just what "science" is, and scholarship—that they have sharp and clearly marked boundaries. But the contrary is the case; and the nearest he comes to facing this difficulty is to devote a page or so (Pamph., pp. 14-16) to the "detail" of "the difference, which at first sight may appear puzzling, between the independent standing claimed here for members of the academic profession and the admittedly subordinate condition of well-trained scientists engaged in... surveying and of scholars employed as bibliographers and the like." But "it is... easy to dispose of the claim of applied scientists in industry or government offices to academic freedom"; the justification is "the distinction between creative and routine work," illustrated by the jigsaw puzzle! A second assumption is the identity of "academic" and "creative" work. Both the distinction and the identification are evidently fallacious. What a state or political division—specifically, a democratic one—"ought" to encourage or allow an "educational" institution it maintains to publish, where matters in political controversy are concerned, cannot be settled by an easy generalization about truth and its rights. It matters little who may say that the controversy turns on a question of "fact." This is true in all degrees of such questions, most so of the economic. Usually the "facts" are too well known to need "scientific research" or admit of it. On the other hand, perhaps not one issue does not involve questions of value, about which the scientist has no more to say than anyone else.

"... of course there is no difference in the personal respect due to the individual..."
The weakness of the whole argument comes out most clearly in the scanty treat-
ment of the activities directed to "a purpose other than advancement of knowledge"
(identified with academic life) which are to be "directed by a central authority." The
dichotomy is "illustrated" by the contrast between judicial and "political" appointments (Pamph., pp. 12-13). To support academic scholarship without affecting its independence, the state need only "regard [it] in the same light as it regards an independent administration of justice." Our Mr. Dooley showed more understanding of the facts in remarking that the "supreme court follows the 'liction returns." The court itself knows better, too, even without such an object lesson as the Roosevelt attempt to "pack" the body. Congress chose to reject the proposal, knowing that "pressure" and human mortality and new appointments would soon bring the court's opinions into line with the policies of the party in power. The dependence of the judiciary on the legislature and/or executive is formally different in England, but not less close.

In the main we find the authorities responsible for "outside purposes" treated as

"the philosophy of all . . . who wish to bring the power of the state into the service of the people without annulling the cherished liberties of a democratic society." Of course, the "fact" is that the policy makes the state serve some of the people by taking things away from others (things rightfully theirs by the rules so far accepted) and either keep them or hand them over to still others. (Though not all the state does or can do, that is the nature of most currently bruited "reforms."). But, though our statement has the proverbial small merit of being "true," to state it baldly is again to beg the question for the other side; for the issue is whether this taking and giving "ought" to be done—or how far, when and how. It is a question of changing the rules. One would like to know how Professor Polanyi classifies such activities between the domain of science or scholarship, where freedom must be virtually absolute, and that of applied science, where there is no valid claim to freedom at all. If he confronted the relevant facts, he surely could not say that any political rumpus in an American state university, during the generation that I have been watching them, hinged on scientific or scholarly research and publication or that the issue was wholly one-sided.
In conclusion, we may sum up the reasons for the reluctant judgment that Professor Polanyi does not contribute much to the solution of the terribly important problem which he treats with so much earnestness and intellectual penetration, and withal so sweet-spiritedly. The problem is free co-operation, which means free agreement (a) on what to do co-operatively and (b) how to organize for making that decision and for conducting the co-operative part of our activities. This social problem arises from the great spiritual revolution of all history. Our culture has taken the fateful step of rejecting the sanctity of tradition and established authority, and it must find norms for judging and changing previously accepted norms. In contrast with the naive faith in "reason" and sympathy, of the revolutionary period, we find that the task threatens to overwhelm us. Interests conflict, and free reconciliation calls for value-premises, appealing to men as reasonable beings and so transcending differences of opinion about rights. (Those who refuse to discuss issues in these terms must be suppressed as criminals; if they are very numerous, free society is impossible.) In short, the philosophical problem (as epistemological) is that of defining the social good, or "justice" in the widest meaning, by describing the social order which embodies the ideal in the highest degree.

Polanyi's solution or program is to pro-

16 Prima facie, the main conflicts center in the "economic" life or aspect of conduct. The principle of free mutuality, at first thought to be the solution, turns out to be far from sufficient. The strong (and/or fortunate) have one-sided obligations to the disadvantaged; there are general interests that transcend arrangements between individuals; and—the supreme fact—society is far more than an organization of given individuals, being largely the creator of individuals, as to both capacities and tastes. (Capacities include the artifacts of civilized life.) The economic view is rather superficial; the problem of conduct is less than that of "satisfying wants" than one of making the rules of a game, a game that covers an infinite variety of component games. But it is both—and correspondingly complex and difficult.
ceed in the way in which "science" proceeds. Science has been an undoubted success, and he argues that the nature of all social problems is the same: an explorative investigation of "reality." Our first question, then, is this: Is "justice" a reality, essentially like the everyday world which we observe, utilize, or playfully manipulate—especially in the sense that we get "knowledge" of both in the same way? Surely, to the plain man, they seem very different, more contrasting than similar. The conclusions of science are "laws," analytically descriptive statements, superficially unlike moral laws—the "is" versus the "ought-to-be," facts about the world "out there" versus feelings in "minds." The latter are called "mental facts" and are affected by a kind of "validity," but this is attributed by different people to widely diverse content. As to how we know or learn, Polanyi establishes essential identity by minimizing and then neglecting the observation and manipulation which are the main part of scientific procedure, in favor of "intuitive contact with reality" and elimination of differences by "free discussion." Observation is first an incidental "clue," then ignored. 17

17 Reality, in this view, must be "spiritual," and it is explicitly so described, sometimes in the Lectures, throughout the Pamphlet (example, the solution of a jigsaw puzzle).

As noted before, acceptance of Polanyi's identification would still beg one main question—whether doing the right is purely a matter of "knowing" what it is. The Christian tradition has been the opposite, in spite of its infusion of Greek thought. Surely, there is truth on both sides. Polanyi says little about the will, adding to the difficulty of interpretation. His position is some kind of philosophic idealism, but there are several kinds. He seems to view reality as made up of archetypes, known by "intuition," but to regard every fashion in feeling attitude as an "intuitive contact with reality." If not, how do we discriminate? And, if so, all problems are unreal, which is absurd. The root difficulty is that we actually have no easy or certain way to tell the real from various forms of the imaginary or to separate the reality of minds and of thoughts, feelings, etc., "in" minds which do and do not "validly" refer to some "independent" reality. Yet one may be philistine (or at least pragmatist) enough to hope the day is past when a bright mind can make a reputation as a philosopher by "proving" that the ideal, or imaginary, in some form or aspect, is the really real, more real than the real. Surely, even in philosophy, truth should be a sensible answer to a sensible question. The "physical" world may ultimately be of the nature of mind; but this hypothesis contributes nothing either to the progress of "science" or to the solution of other problems; at most, a dose of idealism may be "useful" in helping some minds to escape the paralyzing clutches of a (self-contradictory) belief in universal rigorous "causation."

The direct practical concern is the organization of science. For our author the essential thing is its freedom. Concretely, this means two things: internally, the individual investigator is free—scientists are not organized under an authority of their own; and they are also free from external control, meaning by the state. Whoever "controls," say a church, is in so far a state, and the whole argument can have only analogical and very limited significance for the organization of the state—"society," in whatever form it acts as a unit, on its own members or outside. The idea of the state as free, in the sense of science, is simply the ancient dream of the anarchist. And the contradiction is aggravated because science demands support from society. However, Polanyi has an ostensibly way out of the impasse, though it is hardly an improvement. Apparently, he sets up "the legal profession" as another group, on a parity with scientists, to "advance knowledge" in the distinct field of "justice," and he regards all other government functions, the "political," as applying knowledge in accord with "the popular will." The latter he must assume to exist as a unit, and to be expressed. Not unreasonably, as there would not be much to disagree about, seriously, once the full meaning of justice was definitively settled. But this is hardly "democracy" or to politics.

Polanyi's discussion is not of a sort to tempt one to levity. I may say—and so explain the tardiness of this review—that I first read the material in 1947 and have been struggling off and on ever since to find in it a "position" which would stand clear statement, in the light of "reality" and the author's own various formulations. On p. 46 of the Lectures he explicitly assumes that scientists will be competent and sincere—they "must" be—implying that no more is necessary to merit both freedom and power.
and we still have no indication of how the legal profession is to achieve unanimity; it would surely need a fuehrer or an infallible pope.

Before closing I must say a word about the "theoretical" problem of freedom, perhaps the most crucial point in the argument. At the beginning of the pamphlet (p. 3, first page) freedom is defined (one meaning, beyond mere absence of external constraint) as liberation from personal ends by voluntary submission to impersonal obligations, surrender to moral compulsion. And the third lecture is entitled "Dedication or Servitude." The main question is: To what ideal does one surrender or dedicate one's self? And, especially, is it the ideal of impartial pursuit of truth—all valid values—or some concrete belief or end? Here (as observed before) the example of science gets less emphasis than it should. Polanyi himself notes that the surrender theory becomes totalitarian if you regard the state as the supreme guardian of the public good (Pamph., p. 4). But the state is only one possibility; dedication to any absolute is dedication to servitude,

or to establish agreement as fast as needful. On the next page we read: "We may accord the same competence to legal opinion and to certain bodies of religious opinion, a persecuting religion, with a jealous God, like historical Christianity, and immutable truth)."

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or to establish agreement as fast as needful. On the next page we read: "We may accord the same competence to legal opinion and to certain bodies of religious opinion, but probably not to astrological opinion, but probably not to astrological opinion, not or-
can have a plurality of priesthoods, at least for science, law, and religion, dedicated to their respective values, and a public dedicated to accepting the verdict of each in its separate field.

Dedication to ideals a free society certainly must have. But care must be taken that the primary dedication be to freedom itself and competence, on the part of the "public" as a whole. Freedom must be a value on its own account, even when it conflicts with efficiency, in terms of any defined goal, even truth or justice, as eternally provisional. Polanyi's reason for favoring freedom is simply that "freedom is an efficient form of organization," in science at least the only such form; "there is no other efficient way of organizing the team" than "if each is left to follow his own inclinations" (Pamph., p. 5). This is not strictly "true," even when the end is the discovery of scientific truth. And when it is "justice," freedom must be as much end as means. The right of every man to be the judge of his own ends and the mode of realizing them is the premise of a really free society. Yet freedom, limited by respect for the equal freedom of others, cannot be absolute. There are grave problems, conflicts of values, including conditions of life prerequisite to the pursuit of all "higher" value, which cannot be covered by any formula.

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ALTHOUGH organismic theories of society, in which the state is conceived as a body politic, have been pretty generally discredited, one of them has survived in contemporary American political thought. It is still a popular pastime among American political scientists and constitutional lawyers to marvel at the survival of the federal Constitution. They wonder why the famous document of 1789 is still a living constitution, although more than a century and a half have elapsed since its birth. Regarding it as an organism, the allotted span of which is a mere threescore years and ten, it seems remarkable to them that the Constitution should be alive today. They point out that it came into being in a land which was still for the most part an unexplored wilderness and that it is still in existence in the highly populated and industrialized land which is the United States of America today. The survival of the federal Constitution is made to appear all the more astounding by contrasting it with the constitutions of the original thirteen states which have all been replaced by more modern instruments and in most cases more than once.

Almost every work dealing with American constitutional history from Bryce to Brogan contains musings such as these. Carl Brent Swisher, for example, observes in The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States: “One of the most remarkable facts about the American constitutional system is that, as far as the giving of power is concerned, the constitution drafted for the union of the thirteen original states in the relatively primitive era of the 1780’s continues in the 1940’s to serve as the constitution of the most highly industrialized and powerful of the great nations of the world.”* Thus, too (by way of further example), Professor (now Justice) Felix Frankfurter in The Public and Its Government wonders: “How is one to account for the survival of the Constitution for a nation of less than four million scattered along the Atlantic seaboard, in our present empire stretched across the whole continent and beyond, in the Asiatic waters of the Pacific. The seeming puzzle in accentuated by the fact that the Constitution is not a dead document. It is perhaps the livest of our political traditions. It is in a true sense the organ of our political life.”

In other words, by all the rules of logic and experience, the federal Constitution, which is alive, should be dead. Happily, however, there is no corpus delicti. This is the unsolved mystery of 1789—a “whodunit” in reverse.

The standard explanation of the mystery is that the Constitution of 1789 possessed even more remarkable powers of adaptation to changing circumstances than the human body. The Founding Fathers, to whom it has long been customary to attribute superhuman wisdom, created an organ of government which possessed infinite flexibility. In constitution-making there is a choice between two basic methods of procedure. One is to attempt to prescribe in minute detail for all foreseeable contingencies. The other is to lay down only broad general principles of government. The Founding Fathers were certainly wise enough to choose the latter method, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it was forced upon them by a clash of interests so strong that it dictated the avoidance of basic issues as far as possible. They did not even provide in so many words for the power of judicial review of

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legislation but left it to be inferred from the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which declared that the Constitution and the laws made thereunder should be "the supreme law of the land." The institution of judicial review indeed made the contents of the Constitution of secondary importance. The Founding Fathers had embodied in the Constitution such vague clauses as the contract clause and the interstate commerce clause, which could be used, on the one hand, to curb the states and, on the other hand, to expand the powers of the federal government. The contract clause forbade any state to impair "the obligation of contracts," and the commerce clause affirmatively granted power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and John Marshall performed perfect wonders of judicial legerdemain with these handy instruments.

In discussing the survival of the Constitution, it is necessary to make either one of two assumptions: either that the Constitution embodied real limitations, which were honored in practice, or that the limitations of the Constitution were illusory and constantly honored in the breach. If the first assumption be made, then there is presented certainly a remarkable case of constitutional survival. But if, on the other hand, the second assumption is made, the Constitution has not really survived at all. To speak of the survival of a constitution at the cost of the continuous disregard of its basic provisions is a contradiction in terms. In fact, the judiciary was responsible for "preserving" the Constitution by driving through it constantly with a coach-and-four. The wisdom of the Founding Fathers would then seem to consist of devising an instrument of government which did not establish any basic limitations on state-federal relationships. Indeed, it was the power of judicial review which was the secret of the "adaptability" of the Constitution. In a system in which the judges declared what the Constitution meant, it would obviously mean whatever they said it meant. In such a system any question of the survival of the original provisions must be irrelevant. Those aspects of the Constitution which were readily amendable to judicial interpretation would change with every change of alignment in the Supreme Court. A new constitution would come into existence with every shift in the winds of constitutional doctrine.

In other words, the logic of the argument based upon the infinite adaptability of the Constitution defeats itself. It only proves that the Constitution itself was a mythical creature. It could not die because it had never existed. At the very most the Constitution could only be regarded as a sort of invisible man. It is quite impossible, of course, to find the corpus delicti of such a man.

The simple truth of the matter is that there is no mystery. The Constitution of 1789 has not really survived. It has not been adapted. It has been fundamentally altered. The text of the original document is printed in the statute books, in works of political science, and in the World Almanac. But it has been amended so many times that the original provisions have been subverted. The mere number of the amendments is not, perhaps, impressive. The first ten amendments, which constitute our bill of rights, were adopted pursuant to a plan formulated when the Constitution itself was being ratified. In a sense therefore they may be regarded as almost part of the original document. The other eleven amendments, however, radically altered the economic and political system of the United States.

It is, of course, impossible to forget the tragic ordeal of the Civil War—the War between the States. Its significance in the constitutional history of the United States is, however, too readily slighted. What it meant was nothing less than the breakdown of the Constitution of 1789 in its political as well as economic aspects. Even the magic of judicial review had not sufficed to prevent the bitter conflict. Indeed, the attempt to solve the problem of slavery by judicial decision in the Dred Scott case was an important factor in precipitating the holocaust. The constitutional changes which followed the victory of the North on the field of battle can hardly be regarded as mere implementations of the
DISCUSSION

original document or as attempts to restore the political philosophy and order which had been defeated by force of arms. The adoption of the Civil War amendments marked the sharp break with the constitutional past.

The first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, contains only thirty-two words. It spelled, however, the doom of a whole economic system, and a way of life, which had been protected in the Constitution of 1789. It accomplished what the Founding Fathers had not even attempted. It constituted what Charles Beard has called the "second American Revolution." The hold of the planting aristocracy of the South on the government was broken, and the triumph of the northern capitalists was assured. The way was clear for the steady advance of business enterprise. If the Thirteenth Amendment had remained the only change in the Constitution of 1789, it would hardly have been reasonable to speak of the survival of the original polity. But the Thirteenth was followed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, which were designed not only to insure the civil rights of the emancipated Negro slaves but also to subordinate the states definitely to the victorious national government. It was made plain that henceforth the states were no longer to be all but independent sovereignties. The famous "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were to constitute the means of checking any rash legislative experiments within the states. Thus a political as well as an economic revolution were completed.

The Sixteenth Amendment was certainly less revolutionary than the Civil War amendments. It seems to legalize only a particular form of tax—the income tax. It was easy therefore to minimize its importance. But it must not be forgotten that all forms of taxation are means for the redistribution of wealth and that this is particularly true of the income tax—the Achilles heel of capitalism. It has come to constitute the principal source of revenue of the federal government and the chief means of financing the social activities of the federal government today. It has already been employed as an instrument for socializing wealth, and it could be made the basis of a new social revolution.

Political changes are always less important than economic changes. But it is significant that almost all the other amendments to the federal Constitution have had as their purpose the broadening of the base of the electorate or making the federal government more responsive to the popular will. The Twelfth Amendment revised the method of electing the President and Vice-President, the Seventeenth Amendment provided for the direct, popular election of senators, the Nineteenth Amendment inaugurated woman's suffrage, and the Twentieth Amendment abolished "lame-duck" congresses and Presidents. These amendments shifted the incidence of political power even as the other amendments shifted the incidence of economic power. None of these changes could have been accomplished by "adapting" the Constitution of 1789.

The dogma of the longevity of the sacred document, which has not only sentimental but utilitarian values, will nevertheless prove difficult to eradicate. It gives a continuity to our constitutional history and political theory, which flatters the national pride because it makes the Constitution seem unique. Certainly, the Constitution of no other modern country seems to have survived formally for so long a span. Our constitutional beatitude simply reflects the constitution-worship which in lesser or greater degree has always prevailed among Americans. It helps to emphasize the conservative as opposed to the revolutionary tradition in American history. This emphasis in itself serves to discourage too frequent attempts at far-reaching constitutional changes.

The belief in the survival of the Constitution of 1789 has particularly dangerous implications in the international politics of the world today. The continuity of our constitutional practice implies above all an incomparable degree of success in solving political disputes among states. The American ex-
perience in fashioning a workable federalism seems to promise new hope for a viable world order. Annoyed or dismayed by the conflicts within the United Nations, a host of glib publicists have been reminding us again of the superhuman wisdom of the Founding Fathers, who are represented as building even better than they knew. Instead of helping to solve the problems which are threatening the peace of the world, these same publicists have been loudly demanding the creation of a world law and a world government modeled on the Constitution of 1789. They forget not only that the achievement of a formal legal framework has not always been synonymous with peace but also that the Constitution of 1789 has been far from an unqualified success. Even decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have been disregarded when it suited the interests of states. It is only by glossing over the long struggle between North and South which culminated in civil war—one of the bloodiest civil wars in history—that the experiment of 1789 can be made to seem less of a failure. After all, if after the adoption of a world constitution humanity were to be almost destroyed in a war fought with atomic weapons, the pitiful remnant of survivors could hardly derive great comfort from the fact that the war had technically been a civil war rather than an international war. It is to be doubted that a world constitution which “survived” such a catastrophic conflict would become a pastime for mystery-mongers.

FAIRLINGTON, ARLINGTON
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BOOK REVIEWS

**MORALE THÉORIQUE ET SCIENCE DES MœURS.**


Gurvitch’s book is a defense of theoretical ethics against the challenges made in the name of sociology by Lévy-Bruhl and by many other writers since his time. It is a defense based upon “an ethical empiricism of a voluntaristic type”: “This radical empiricism of action will carry us to a complete reconciliation of theoretical ethics and the sociology of morals as being two different but closely related ways of reflecting upon the infinitely variable data of moral experience” (pp. 7-8).

Gurvitch’s empiricism takes as its starting point the human actions which he calls conduct (les conduites): “Gestures and bodily movements, collective or individual, are conduct only when they satisfy the double condition of being voluntary (non-automatic) and of implying an internal meaning which we can grasp” (p. 165).

With respect to this starting point, the sociology of morals (science des mœurs, sociologie de la morale) can be defined as the study of all the many and various actions which can qualify as conduct. With respect to the same starting point, theoretical ethics (la morale théorique) can be defined as the study of the internal meanings implied by the actions which can qualify as conduct.

The sociology of morals is assigned three tasks (pp. 202-3): (1) to distinguish the moral facts—the actions which are conduct—from other social facts, especially religious and legal facts; (2) to describe the observable contents of these facts and to classify them into types; and (3) to place the moral facts in the whole system of social facts and to study their correlations with these other facts.

Theoretical ethics is also assigned three tasks (pp. 200-201): (1) to discover the meanings implied by the moral facts—which, eventually, is to reach by reflection the data of immediate moral experience; (2) to bring out the distinguishing characteristics of immediate moral experience by relating it to other types of immediate experience; and (3) to establish the validity of the data of immediate moral experience—values, that is—by interrelating them in an infinite system in which each has its unique place.

The first two tasks of the two subjects, Gurvitch states, are closely interrelated. Theoretical ethics begins its work with the moral facts which the sociology of morals gathers, describes, and classifies. But the sociology of morals makes use of the results of theoretical ethics in distinguishing the social facts which are moral and in determining the classes into which they are to be divided: “The progress of each of these disciplines is a function of the progress of the other, and nothing can better facilitate their development than an awareness of the fundamental nature of the tie between them” (p. 204).

In his discussion of the first task of theoretical ethics and of the results obtained by it, Gurvitch reveals the main outlines of his ethical theory. The “internal meaning” implied by conduct, he explains (pp. 165-66), seems superficially to consist in the fact that the action pursues a goal (un but). More profoundly, though, it consists in the fact that the goal of the action includes certain ends (fins) and does not violate certain categorical imperatives. But, more profoundly still, the meaning consists in the immediate moral experience which lies back of both the ends and the imperatives.

Within immediate moral experience Gurvitch distinguishes three successive levels (pp. 170 ff.), beginning with the most superficial: (1) the experience of duties (a duty here is an “ideal ought-to-be”: “the infinite which separates the unrealized value from existence.”), (2) the experience of values, (3) the experience of creative liberty. In the second and third of these and in their interrelations lies the key to Gurvitch’s theory.

The experience of values, he tells us, consists in an act of decision, a voluntary preference in which both the value itself and the degree of its positiveness is assayed (épondre). The experience of creative liberty is an experi-
enforce of "going beyond duties and values to participate in their creation" (p. 184). Gurvitch's theory, then, is obviously a voluntaristic one.

But it is far from being a subjectivist theory—far from being the sort of theory proposed by Polin, for example. For Gurvitch, an act of decision is not merely a decision but a decision-intuition. And, too, such an act of decision-intuition is not the act of an isolated individual but of a group or of an individual as a member of a group. Indeed, it at times seems to be almost an act in which individuals and groups participate in a creativity which transcends them both.

In defense of his own theory Gurvitch marshals the similar theories of many other writers past and present. This material—the contents of chapters ii and iii—is good defense, to be sure; but it is also quite worth while in itself. It is, though brief, one of the best and most convincing presentations of voluntaristic ethical theory that I have encountered.

In Du lait, du mal, du faux, Polin continues with the presentation of the theory of value which he introduced in two books published in 1944: La Création des valeurs and La Compréhension des valeurs. Those who have read the earlier books will find the present one a worthy addition. Those who have not, I feel, will do well to forego the present one in favor of the earlier ones. In other words, the present book is not what it would seem to be by its title—a treatise upon negative value. Instead, it is a further development of Polin's own notion of value through a consideration of its implications with respect to negative value.

Polin's theory is one that defines value as a function of the actions of persons. A value, that is, is that which is taken by a person as the end of an action, that toward which the action moves, that which the action, so far as it is successful, realizes. Such actions, however, have no intuitive aspect and no transindividual aspect as they do in Gurvitch's theory. All other conceptions of value—especially all those that claim any objectivity for values—are impossible, according to Polin.

Because most, if not all, conceptions of negative value are special applications of the general conceptions of value which Polin denies, his discussion of them in terms of his own theory serves to throw little light upon them. His proposal of a substitute for negative value does, however, throw light upon his own theory. Negative values properly interpreted, he says, are critical values:

In other words, all the values that we call "negative" can be used to evaluate (mesurer, apprécier) the axiological harmony of values among themselves, of a new value in relation to a system of given values, of a result in relation to the value which inspired the producing of it, of an action in relation to its principles, its intentions, or its results [p. 114].

But negative values reinterpreted as critical values are, like all values, functions of the individual actions of individual persons. Polin is consistently voluntaristic and subjectivist.
to give the author's own explanation: "Those read only will be good, from the point of view of political wisdom, which lead to the quieting of human reality, maintaining it in a situation of stable equilibrium and channelling the inevitable movement along a regulated and calculable route. Hence it is that Machiavellian wisdom is... eminently 'rhetoric.' The pragmatic and technical dimension of Machiavellian knowledge obliges the man of knowledge, not only to 'know how to be,' but also to 'know how to seem.' Man's natural propensity to error makes the majority of men—the vulgar—incapable of distinguishing 'being' from 'seeming.' Hence the political art is primordially 'rhetoric,' art of persuading, of conquering opinion" (pp. 165-66). And speech, obviously, is but one means of guiding the opinions of men. The general conception of politics as rhetoric is perhaps not so clear to the reader as he might wish, but he may look forward to the systematic treatise which the author has promised soon to devote to the history of the theme.

It would be misleading to give the impression, however, that the whole examination of Machiavelli thenceforth dwells on his alleged rhetorical conception of politics; on the contrary, this thesis appears only here and there in a discussion of many topics: the meanings of virtue, necessity, and fortune and the relations between them; the meanings of order; the nature of political wisdom; the distinction between political and diplomatic knowledge; Machiavelli's opinion of Cesare Borgia; his estimate of his own times—with regard to many such topics Javier Conde presents textual evidence for the incorrectness of previous views. Nor should one leave the impression that the conception of politics as rhetoric is also Javier Conde's. Objective though the author's treatment is, the thesis appears only here and there in a discussion of many topics. The advantages of a translation by the foremost interpreter of Kant's doctrine now writing in English have been exploited, while temptations to rewrite the text to satisfy a particular interpretation have been avoided. The result is excellent.

An unprecedented number of English translations of the Grundlegung are now available. Abbott's old reliable version has just been issued and there is a new one by Lewis White Beck—both of these in volumes which also contain the Critique of Practical Reason with further selections from Kant's ethical writings. Of the Grundlegung itself there is Manthey-Zorn's translation as well as this by Paton. But, apart from the advantages or disadvantages of having the Grundlegung by itself or combined with other treatises, Professor Paton's treatment is the most satisfactory, as Manthey-Zorn's is perhaps the least.

Paton combines the most readable English style with an unequaled capacity of allowing Kant's characteristic distinctions to show through the veil of an alien language. Beck's work is of comparable accuracy, and an alert reader who knows what the issues are will not be misled by it. But Paton draws attention to the issues, helping the reader to make discriminations by such devices as italics, capitalization ("Idea" for Idee in its technical sense, "idea" for Vorstellung, making clear that the generic Vorstellung, making clear that the generic Vorstellung), bracketed headings calling attention to the structure of the argument, and occasional brief but instructive notes. There is also a helpful "Analysis of the Argument" of forty pages which applies itself strictly to the business of following the text rather than discussing upon its history, its relations to other works of its own or other authors, or its final significance.
that this volume will circulate widely in the United States.  

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Suppose that, as the inmate of a Nazi concentration camp, you were forced to decide which of your fellow-inmates should be sent to the gas chambers and which not—and to force you to decide would be the easiest thing in the world for anyone determined to do so. You would then be confronted with a moral problem of piercing intensity and terrific import. How would you decide? By the criterion of the greatest pleasure of the greatest number or, at all events, the least pain for the most? If you have imagined yourself into the situation, you will see the absurdity of this criterion. By the criterion of what is right? I think you would have to conclude that nothing is “right,” perhaps even that all possible decisions would be equally “wrong.” By the criterion of what would make for the greatest self-realization, somehow, for somebody? This solution might make somewhat more sense, but I doubt that it would really help you to decide. No, you are simply confronted by the choice, horrible though the confrontation is, and you cannot bring in to help you these criteria extraneous to the moral situation: you must choose. But is there nothing more that can be said? Yes, there is something more. In choosing one of the dread alternatives, you are doing what you freely can do: you are exercising the freedom you possess as a human being. You are freely assuming the responsibility for the consequences of your choice. And nothing more now? Yes, even yet there is something more. You can so act as, in the measure possible, to preserve freedom.

Such, then, it seems to me (and I have developed a problem taken from Beauvoir herself) well typifies the moral situations that impress this existentialist. I confess it is not altogether clear to me in all cases—and the above is one—how the exercise of freedom will or can preserve freedom; but there are mysteries, too, in other modes of ethical thought; and if they may be tolerated here, why should they not also be tolerated here? For if one may take duty or right or good or virtue or pleasure, and so forth, as fundamental in ethics, I do not see why one might not equally well regard freedom as the main aspect of moral experience and the concept of freedom as the first principle of moral theory.

It will be necessary, of course, in such a theory as in theories of those other types, to relate to the central concept those concepts taken as central elsewhere; since they all represent, if not genuine, at least seeming, aspects of moral experience. In the ethics of Beauvoir, for instance, freedom is the source of all meanings and values (p. 24): “The supreme end at which man must aim is his freedom, which alone is capable of establishing the value of every end; thus comfort, happiness, all relative goods which human projects define, will be subordinated to this absolute condition of realization” (p. 113). And besides meaning, value, end, happiness, freedom also provides moral law; the law, namely, that “the freedom of other men must be respected and they must be helped to free themselves” (p. 60). Or perhaps one should say, rather, that man “finds his law in his very freedom” (p. 156). In freedom, moreover, we shall “discover a principle of action whose range will be universal” (p. 23). Its treatment of freedom makes existentialism, in fact, unique among philosophies: Man may escape his freedom; “and it is precisely because an evil will is here possible that the words ‘to will oneself free’ have a meaning. Therefore, not only do we assert that the existentialist doctrine permits the elaboration of an ethics, but it even appears to us as the only philosophy in which ethics has a place.” For while a metaphysics of transcendence reduces evil to error and humanistic philosophies cannot account for it, “existentialism alone gives—like religions—a real role to evil . . .” (pp. 33-34). These references, I think, should give some idea of the ordering of ethical concepts from Beauvoir’s perspective.

It is another matter, indeed, whether her ethics is more adequate, as she obviously supposes, than the ethics, say, of Kant or Plato or whomever or whether, all in all, it is even as adequate. I do think that she has an important insight, if I understand her, namely, that many and perhaps even the most important ethical problems arise beyond the area in which the traditional considerations of moral philosophy can give much help. But that is not, I believe, to disallow the value of those considerations within certain bounds. I do not see, moreover, that the insight, or even the intimations of the treat-
ment these further problems should receive, has
any intrinsic connection with the existentialist
way of thinking—or, perhaps, lest any other
such treatment should be claimed also for ex-


tentialism, I ought rather to say, “with the

existentialist way of talking.” Not does the de-

velopment of ethical concepts seem to me at all
well worked out: Beauvoir may be going in the
right direction and yet plunging through the

lulus. Finally, I suspect that Kant, though im-

measurably more clear a thinker than Beauvoir,

may be as good an “existentialist” as Beauvoir

himself when he comes, in the Metaphysics of

Moral, to the problem of the actual moral

choice.

Nonetheless, I should judge this work to be
exceedingly penetrating in its treatment of

moral experience. Beauvoir is a very concrete

thinker, with sharp eyes for the problems of real

life. She gives brilliant descriptions of moral

types; indeed, her portrayal of types, in its small

scale, is not incomparable to some of Hegel’s

large-scale portraiture in the Phenomenology of

Mind. Also, she makes acute analyses of genu-

ine moral problems. And to praise or to depre-

ciate these analyses as casuistry would be from

her standpoint, I should say, equally erroneous:

the concrete is not, for Beauvoir, the place

where one applies moral rules; it is the place,

rather, where one makes moral decisions.

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The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. Edited
by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Evanston: Library
xxviii+936. $6.00.

I think I am not wrong in saying that this

latest in Paul Arthur Schilpp’s valuable series

presents more of laudation, exposition, and ap-

plication, and less of criticism, than the earlier

volumes. Such a spirit of admiration runs

through the contributions, indeed, that it proves

practicable to indicate most of the criticisms in

a short note; and to do so will be, I imagine,

the best way of treating the book here.

William Curtis Swaby, in “Cassirer and

Metaphysics,” undertakes “to make explicit
certain difficulties which I find, not so much
in Cassirer’s writings as such, but in the point

of view of idealism itself” (p. 123). I. K. Stephens,
in “Cassirer’s Doctrine of the A Priori,” finds it

possible to agree that “the a priori is of the mind

and is the basis of all necessity and of all cer-

tainty in knowledge” but contends that Cassi-

rer’s “conception of the essential nature of the a

priori is untenable, both in the light of logic and

from the standpoint of what is revealed in a

critical analysis of knowledge” (pp. 171-72), so

that Cassirer’s efforts were futile if his purpose,
in extending the Critique of Reason into a Cri-

tique of Culture, “was to show that the a priori

consists of a set of invariant principles” (p. 181).

Dimitry Gavronsky, in “Cassirer’s Contribu-
tion to the Epistemology of Physics,” raises, not

as a criticism but as a query, the answer to

which should prove of great interest, why in

Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff Cassirer

ignored Einstein’s theory of relativity five years

after the latter’s first fundamental publication

thereon (p. 224). Harold R. Smart, in “Cas-

sirer’s Theory of Mathematical Concepts,”

finds that Cassirer, in spite of solid and enduring

accomplishments, is entangled in abstract for-

malism (p. 267). Folke Leander sets forth “Fur-

ther Problems Suggested by the Philosophy of

Symbolic Forms”; 1) the unification of the pre-

scientific symbolic forms; 2) a more careful dis-

tinction between form and material; 3) an anal-

ysis of the logic of history and the logic of phi-

losophy” (p. 337).

To Wilbur M. Urban, in “Cassirer’s Phi-

losophy of Language,” Cassirer seems ambigu-

ous on several issues: “Are the natural cate-

gories of language, although useful for practice,

wholly erroneous when applied to the sphere of

theory?” (p. 419). “Is it, or is it not, the fate of

religion to be dissolved into something else—

into a philosophy which is no longer religious or

into a mysticism which is no longer theologi-

cal?” (p. 425). The basal science, for Cassirer,

the mathematical-physical. But there are biol-

ogy, psychology, and the Geisteswissenschaften,

which “employ other languages and exhibit

very different symbolic form. Are they science

or are they not?” (p. 432). What is “the relation

do the scientific, more specifically the mathemati-

cal symbol, to ordinary language” (p. 433)?

Corresponding to a metaphysical sphere of what

is not resolvable into the sensible and the mea-

urable, “the question arises whether...there is

not a language of metaphysics and a metaphysi-

cal symbolism” (p. 433). Is the critical tran-

scendental method “the denial of metaphysics

or itself a metaphysics” (p. 435)? All the funda-

mental symbolic forms have meaning; “do they

all also have truth?” (p. 439).

By far the longest contribution is that of

David Bedney, “On the Philosophical Anthro-
pology of Ernst Cassirer and Its Relation to the History of Anthropological Thought." Bidney makes many criticisms, among which are the following: He questions "whether Cassirer has really overcome Kant's epistemological dualism. So far as one can gather, Cassirer has replaced the Kantian dualism of form and content by the duality of function and content, but function as he conceives it appears to be equally formal" (pp. 500-501). Bidney also questions "whether Cassirer's psychological interpretation of myth and magic is not itself mythical" (p. 509). And Bidney finds that Cassirer uses, without explicit recognition of the change, both idealistic and realistic views of the symbol (p. 506), both a superorganic and a functionalistic interpretation of culture (p. 515); that his assumption of a unity of psychological motivation or social function for the myth is uncritical (p. 517); that he attempts to combine the antithetical ethnological views of Lévy-Bruhl and Malinowski (p. 537); that, in his concern for the power of cultural symbols, "he failed to reckon realistically with the power of the objects to which the symbols referred" (p. 450); and that he "was led by his faith in the higher rationality of humanity to overlook the serious practical problems of cultural conflict and disunity" (p. 544).

According to Helmut Kuhn, in "Cassirer's Philosophy of Culture," "constrained by the logic of his transcendental identification, he comes to embrace an archaically simplified [Parmenidean] concept of Being" (p. 554), although he showed his creative abilities in using transcendental logic, nevertheless, as "an effective tool for coping with problems of the human world" (p. 557). Harry Slochower, in "Ernst Cassirer's Functional Approach to Art and Literature," appears to criticize Cassirer's aesthetic dialectic as one of reconciliation rather than of opposition and charges him with slighting "the rôle of social materials" and all but ignoring "the weight of personal psychic elements" (pp. 652 ff.). John Herman Randall, Jr., in "Cassirer's Theory of History as Illustrated in His Treatment of Renaissance Thought," accusses Cassirer of being "too ready to set up his own distinctive conceptions and working principles as the sufficient model for every approach to the past" and objects to "his almost total lack of concern with any questions of historical causation" (p. 793). William H. Werkmeister, in concluding his discussion of "Cassirer's Advance beyond Neo-Kantianism," finds that the philosophy of symbolic forms needs further clari-

fication with respect to the relationship between "language as an instrument useful in integrating experience" and "science or mythology as 'point of view' and as mode of integration" and that Cassirer leaves much work undone on the epistemological basis for the cultural sciences (pp. 797-98). Finally, Fritz Kaufmann brings out various defects of Cassirer's philosophy from the standpoint of phenomenology in Husserl's sense.

Such, then, are the criticisms to which Cassirer's death made a reply impossible. But the editor was nonetheless right in publishing the book. For the criticisms do indicate problems that require further considerations by others, in lack of Cassirer; and the expository material—much of it falling in essays which I have not mentioned above—will serve to convey some idea of the many works of Cassirer's that are not available in English and, I hope, to stimulate a further demand for their translation. Perhaps in conclusion I should observe that there is one essay, by David Baumgardt, "Cassirer and the Chaos in Modern Ethics," which considers in relation to some present currents his apparently not extensively developed views on ethics.

Arthur Child

University of Chicago


The Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver has celebrated its twentieth anniversary by asking seven men who might be expected to provide as much good counsel as is at present available on the matter to say whether and how, in their view, the world can emerge from its present disturbed condition into a period of greater political stability. When people write books, they often obscure their main ideas among a lot of clever and interesting side issues. It is reasonable to hope, however, that people with something to say about important issues will, if they are limited to a single lecture, try to say the most important thing they have to say. Thus the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver acted wisely in asking these men to speak on this theme. We now have to ask how they assess the prospects and what advice they give.
None of the lecturers is happy about the prospects. Chancellor Hutchins, who writes on the "Constitutional Foundations for World Order," is the most unhappy, since he thinks that unless war is abolished very soon indeed, before Russia, or some other power potentially hostile to the United States, has atomic bombs, there will be an atomic war, and "another war will mean the end of civilization" (p. 110). Professor Woodward, writing as a historian, also thinks that an atomic war would bring the destruction of our urban and industrial civilization (though agricultural life would continue and ultimately give rise to a new one), but he also remarks that mankind has escaped from extremely desperate situations in the past through "some hidden gyroscopic action which brings the ship of humanity back to an even keel just when it seems to have gone too far to right itself" (pp. 25-26). None of the contributors shows any confidence that atomic war will be avoided, although Professor Woodward and Dr. Oppenheimer (who writes on "The Scientific Foundations of World Order") think that as soon as several governments have atomic bombs they may all be too frightened to use them. The contributors rightly emphasize the new situation created by the atomic bomb. It should be noted, however, that prolonged "cold war," with the hatred and insecurity it involves, may be an even greater danger to civilization than atomic bombs are. These affect civilization through hatred and insecurity it involves, may be an even greater danger to civilization than atomic bombs are. These affect civilization through men's bodies and surroundings. Film, radio, and bombs are. These affect civilization through

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hatred and insecurity it involves, may be an even greater danger to civilization than atomic bombs are. These affect civilization through men's bodies and surroundings. Film, radio, and bombs are. These affect civilization through
The principle of the selections included is readily apparent and, granting the limitations of space, quite commendable. It is unfortunate, however, that the editor felt himself compelled to provide a more promising and practicable principle, one that would be point out that the aim of winning the war as quickly as possible provided a less nebulous and controversial basis for agreement on specific allocations than would be forthcoming if the needs of the countries and populations entering into the agreement became the criterion for distribution. Geographers, economists, and social workers could possibly agree together on who needed most and how best to satisfy the needs. But it is unlikely that they would be given the power to bring their agreements into effect. Indeed, it may be doubted whether they ought to have such power. For, except when, as in free trade, there is a mechanism which more or less automatically co-ordinates the decisions of the individual specialists, it is necessary for someone to decide which proposals of which group of specialists are, at any given moment, the most urgent. The agricultural experts may decide that the Chinese need tractors more than anybody else does, and that tractors can be provided and transported. But if the political situation leads governments to fear that before long they will need tanks, the agriculturalists cannot be permitted to proceed with their project, however admirable it may be in itself. The hope that technical agreements among experts may lead to important political agreements between their governments is therefore illusory. At a time when white slavery does not appear to have serious political implications, social reformers and officials can agree on how to reduce it, and their governments can be goaded by them into trying to do so. But because broadcasting appears to have political implications, the agreements of wireless technicians on the allocation of wave-lengths may remain a dead letter. When there are serious political disagreements everything thought relevant to them will be forgotten in the case of future texts by non-English writers, of printing the original Latin side by side with an English translation. The selections comprise Book i of the De regimine principum, the complete De regimine Judaeorum, some political passages from the two Summas and from the commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and finally the introductory lecciones to the commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Professor d'Entréves's lucid introduction sets Aquinas' political writings into L.
to present the selections from the *Summa theologiae* in mutilated fragments: in most cases only the *Respondentia dicendum* is given, and in some cases the reply to particular objections. But the objections themselves are not stated; consequently the dialectical force and much of the philosophic context of Aquinas' replies are lost, as is the unparalled historical perspective which the objections afford.

The translator, in an introductory note, states that he has "found it necessary to adopt at times a certain freedom in translation which inevitably raises questions of interpretation" (p. xcv). This reviewer has rarely come across a case where such "freedom" has been more grossly abused. The problems of translation are old and well rehearsed; the translator himself quotes, in justification of his procedure, the following statement of Thomas Aquinas: "The good translator should not only be concerned with the sense of the truths he translates, he should also adapt his style to the genius of the language in which he is expressing himself." Obviously much depends on how one interprets "sense" and "genius." The extremely literal translation which William of Moerbeke, at the behest of Thomas, made of Aristotle's Greek into Latin, and which Thomas himself used in writing his commentaries, provides one answer to this question. But the present translator goes to the opposite extreme: he has used his freedom in such a fashion that some of the most basic concepts of Aquinas are blurred or distorted. A complete list of the inadequacies of the translation would thus necessitate a rewriting of the whole.

A few cases must suffice to illustrate this charge. We may begin with the title of the first treatise. Dawson translates *De regimine principum* as "On Princely Government." But this is misleading, for it obscures the fact that for Aquinas, as for his contemporaries, *princeps* is a general term applying to any kind of political "ruler," not only to monarchic rulers or "princes." Thus Aquinas refers to the *principatum paucorum* (*De reg. princ. i. 1; p. 6*), and declares also that *circa bonum ordinatem principum* (p. 148); the translator here correctly renders the last Latin phrase as "in the government." A more correct translation of the title would therefore have been "On the Governance of Rulers," as G. B. Phelan rendered it in his version published in 1932.

Far more serious is Dawson's systematic obfuscation of the philosophic concepts on which Thomas' political theory rests. Consider the basic concept of "order" (*ordo*), in terms of which Thomas explains much of the structure, function, and justification of the state. A bewildering array of circumlocutions is employed by the translator to obscure the centralized pattern of Thomas' explanations. Thus, at the beginning of the *De regimine principum*, where Thomas is setting forth his explanation of man's need for the state, he says: "In omnibus autem quae ad finem aliquem ordinatur . . . opus est aliquo dirigente," which Dawson translates: "Now whenever a certain end has been decided upon . . . someone must provide direction" (p. 3; my italics here and in all other quotations). But this makes Aquinas' objective "order" into a subjective "decision"; it completely hides the fact that according to Aquinas men objectively "are ordered to a certain end," as the next sentence of the treatise shows: "hominis autem est aliquis finis, ad quem tota vita eius et actio ordinatur," which Dawson renders: "man . . . has a destiny to which all his life and activities are directed," thus again hiding the concept of order. And when Aquinas, in the *Summa theologica* (i*ii*®*, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3) writes that "homo non ordinatur ad communitem politican secundum et secundum se omnia," thus indicating the objective limits of the "ordering" of man to the state, Dawson translates this as: "Not all that a man has or is, is subject to political obligation" (p. 109), which once more obscures the emphasis on "order" which Thomas' Latin insistently exhibits.

Consider, further, Aquinas' commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which begins: "Sicut dicit Philosophus in principio *Metaphysicae*, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius primum est cognoscere ordinem." Dawson's translation runs as follows: "The Philosopher teaches at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* that the proper task of the wise is to bring order into affairs. The explanation for this is to be sought in the fact that wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, and it is reason which brings things to order" (p. 185). The two italicized phrases make it appear as if the only relation of "reason" to "order" were a practical or productive one, "to bring order into affairs." This completely hides the fact that for Thomas the function of reason is "to know [cognoscere] order," and that there is thus an important relation wherein reason does
not "bring" order "into" things ab extra but rather contemplates an objective order pre-existing in things. Thus Dawson's translation is in that contradiction to Aquinas' subsequent statement that "ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur" (which Dawson renders by omitting the reference to "reason": "order may be considered in four different ways"), the first of these comparisons of order to reason being the following: "Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit, sed solum considerat." But how can it be understood that the generic relation of "reason" to "order" is that reason "brings order into affairs" or "brings things to order," when the first species of this relation is that "there is a certain order which reason does not make, but only considers"?

We may sum up our examination of the translation of the basic Thomist doctrine of "order" throughout this volume (the examples given above could be multiplied many times over; cf. p. 111 for some particularly glaring cases) as follows: The translation obscures the doctrine by rendering the single term ordo by a wide variety of paraphrases, and it falsifies the doctrine by converting its objective, natural aspects into subjective, conventional ones.

Much the same criticisms apply to other phases of the translation. It omits important terms, such as naturaliter in the middle of page 2; it misinterprets them, such as the translation of communications by "able to communicate" (p. 5); it shifts the translation of the same Latin term from one line to the next for no apparent reason, thereby breaking the necessary continuity of meaning, as when finis is translated within five lines by "end," "destination," "des-tiny" (p. 3) and consiliiatur by "question," while two lines later consiliiari is rendered by "de-liberate" (p. 11).

The Aristotelian scholastic philosophers were emphatic on the necessity for precision in terminology. When a translator, on the plea of conforming to English linguistic style, blurs and breaks that precision, he commits a distinct dis-service to the cause of making the doctrines known to English readers.

ALAN GEWIRTH

University of Chicago

SHORTER NOTICES


Wheelwright calls his book a "revised edition" of the Critical Introduction to Ethics, which he published first in 1935. In spite of custom and modesty, he would do better to call it "an extensively and effectively revised edition." In the Preface he summarizes the changes which he has made: "The entire book has been taken under scrutiny, and I have freely rewritten, added or deleted, and rearranged, wherever it appeared that I could clarify or usefully amplify ethical problems in either their practical or philosophical aspect. Chapter 8, "Religious Ethics," is entirely new, as are the discussions of ethical relativism in Chapter 2 and of history in Chapter 13" (p. vii). And to this can be added a further statement from a promotional letter distributed by the Odyssey Press: "Altogether, more than fifty per cent of the revision is new or rewritten."

The topics discussed in Wheelwright's book are the topics which have become more or less standard in American textbooks on ethics: the nature of ethics, the method of ethics, the various types of ethical theories, the applications of ethics to society, the metaphysical foundations of ethics. (There is also a battery of "teaching aids," including questions, discussion topics, reading lists, and a glossary.)

The discussion of the various topics, however, is anything but standard. Wheelwright's method—his "dialectical method," as he calls it—is a combination of exposition and critical comment. The exposition is extraordinarily good. Each topic is developed amply and is presented honestly and lucidly. The critical comment is in part straightforward criticism of the opinions and theories presented in the exposition. In other part, though, it is criticism by comparison with the humanism and religious ethics discussed in chapters 7 and 8—by comparison with what are probably Wheelwright's own conclusions in ethics. So far as the critical comment is of this latter sort, of course, it is technically faulty. I suspect, however, that it is nonetheless pedagogically sound in that it has an unusual degree of unity and direction. (Wheelwright probably would claim here that his criticism is not a criticism of Wheelwright's book, but of the people and ideas which confronts it.)

The Aristotelian scholastic philosophers failed to reach objective order in the ordering of things. Therefore, he published first in 1935. In spite of custom and modesty, he would do better to call it "an extensively and effectively revised edition." In the Preface he summarizes the changes which he has made: "The entire book has been taken under scrutiny, and I have freely rewritten, added or deleted, and rearranged, wherever it appeared that I could clarify or usefully amplify ethical problems in either their practical or philosophical aspect. Chapter 8, "Religious Ethics," is entirely new, as are the discussions of ethical relativism in Chapter 2 and of history in Chapter 13" (p. vii). And to this can be added a further statement from a promotional letter distributed by the Odyssey Press: "Altogether, more than fifty per cent of the revision is new or rewritten."

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his critical comment presupposes only the terms and postulates and "over-beliefs" which he presents in chapter 13.)

The only important fault that I can find in Wheelwright's book is perhaps just another merit: it is probably beyond the intellectual reach of many college students.

Robinson's text is in part a revision of his Political Ethics, in part a revision of various of his addresses and papers, and in part new material. Most of the book is devoted to the "standard topics" already listed. (And again there is a battery of "teaching aids." In addition, there are two unusual sections. One of these—chapters iii, iv, and v—discusses morality prior to the appearance of reflective ethics. The other—chapters xv, xvii, and xviii—discusses the ethical aspects of "the atomic age.

Robinson's method is the one that he used so successfully in such books as his Political Ethics and his Anthology of Modern Philosophy. It consists in selecting, summarizing, simplifying, and integrating a considerable number of technical works of high quality. Unfortunately, he did not use the method successfully in the present book.

The two introductory chapters on the nature and method of ethics and the next twelve chapters on theoretical ethics are considerably below the usual quality of Robinson's work. Probably the greatest fault of these chapters is their extraordinary brevity. They average a little better than ten pages apiece. One of them which discusses Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (chap. vi) is a bare ten pages. Perhaps the chapter which suffers most from this brevity is the last one (chap. xiv), in which Robinson attempts to synthesize the various types of ethics discussed in the preceding chapters. One paragraph from this chapter will illustrate the breathless rush which characterizes it:

It is obvious that perfectionism is the ethical theory which comes the nearest to being all-inclusive with respect to the five elements of a typical moral situation. (The five elements are law, agent, act, effects, and impartial spectators.) Moreover, this was the first great classic theory to be conceived by the mind of man, and its complete development was the work of the three greatest of the philosophers of ancient Athens. It has survived through the centuries, but it has been reformulated anew time and time again. Our final evaluation of the types of ethical theory is that perfectionism must again be reintegrated to meet the needs of people of the atomic age, and this will be attempted in the next two chapters [pp. 196-57].
treat the problems "with the greatest historical objectivity, at the same time as with the fullness and freedom indispensable in the scientific task."

ARTHUR CHILD


The authors have gathered together here, to the end indicated in the subtitle, some seventy-five articles or sections of articles through which to introduce elementary students to politics. All selections are contemporary, the overwhelming majority are by Americans, and they all, whether by Americans or not, bear upon the American scene. The book is thus narrower than the title. But the selections are viable and provocative. There are no introductions or notes. The authors are but editors, contenting themselves with twelve chapter headings under which the selections are grouped. It is worth observing that the publishing job is excellent: fine paper, sturdy binding, and excellent format to give the maximum amount of reading for a price which is very moderate, as current prices go.

T. V. SMITH


In this combined introductory text- and casebook we find sociologists working with cultural anthropologists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, and political and social philosophers on a broad front involving many diverse problems. Some grasp of the unity as well as of the immensity of the task awaiting the investigator is made clearer here, and the distinction between sociology and cultural anthropology is shown to be a rapidly disappearing one.

The growing pains of a relatively new empirical science are much in evidence. The avoidance of metaphysics (on the naive assumption that the old dogmatic and absolutistic variety is the only kind) and of logical structure results in a lack of precise definition and the examination of foundations, and there is an adherence to the level of enlightened common sense at the expense of the exploration of analytical levels. Analysis is carefully avoided in that causes are not sought, and description tends to replace exact formulation. We are not told precisely what culture is, and we are not given any examples of attempts to set forth invariants under successive cultural transformation. On the empirical side, even lists of cultural constants, such as Murdock has given elsewhere, are explained in terms of human individuals and social groups alone: their psychology and overt behavior. Tools and institutions as culture objects are not sufficiently considered. The objective nature of the sociological (or cultural) subject matter tends to become fatally psychologized.

Nevertheless, some conception of the enormous complexity involved in the attempt to make a science of sociology comes through the agglomerate contributions of this book; and the strengths and weaknesses of the work correspond to the achievements and shortcomings of the science thus far, which is only another way of saying that as a textbook it does what it sets out to do.

JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN


I find inescapable the impression from this book, as from so many of the books issued by "Philosophical Library" as publishers, that the main desideratum is the charge of $3.00 for a book of 148 pages (including the Preface by Roscoe Pound and the Index). That said as fair warning, let this be said as an attempt at just judgment in general. The title is a misnomer. The book treats of everything (in so few pages) from "ontology" (which is the first chapter) to "collective existence" (which is the last chapter). In between is the other chapter, entitled "Individual Existence." Under this title, which alone seems to fit the advertised intent of the book, is treated "The Purpose of Human Existence," "The cultivation of Tao and Teh," "Cheng, Sophi-Conscience," "Sequence of the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean:—The States of Self-establishment and the Establishment of Others," "The Way of the Mean," and "The Gospel of the Five Human Relationships." This is sufficient to indicate that if the real purpose of the publication was, as advertised, the contribution which Chinese philosophy, ancient and persisting, has to make to the West and to the world, then a translation is required of the translation here presented.
book reviews

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THEODORE L. PRIESTMAN

book reviews

...from this possibly. It is perhaps true that the book was written for a profane audience; but where as fair a chance as one can have at just the same season by the Yale University Press (but 474 pages for $4.50, and that in addition to index and preface): Northrop's symposium entitled Ideological Differences and World Order.

T. V. SMITH


The subtitle informs us of what this book actually contains; the title, I suppose, indicates that ideological differences have some significance for world order; and that the combining of the two, I judge from the Preface, suggests that such studies might contribute to a resolution or mitigation of the ideological differences that allegedly present obstacles to world order. What "ideological" means, however, I was unable to discover from the contributions of the editor and presumptive authority. From one passage, where he says that "a normative social theory, when its assumptions are made explicit, defines an ideology or in other words a possible moral and social philosophy" (p. 424), one might gather that ideologies are philosophies or perhaps moral and social philosophies. In numerous other contexts, however, "ideological" seems more plausibly interpreted as referring to ideas in general, in a sense analogous to that in which "biological" refers to life in general. In other contexts, however, "ideological" seems more plausibly interpreted as referring to ideas in general, in a sense analogous to that in which "biological" refers to life in general. In mentioning the matter I may be quibbling, I recognize; but I should remark, by way of explanation, that I like to know what the books I read are supposed to be about. I miss also a demonstration that "ideological differences" do militate against world order; since, attaching to "ideological" either of the two meanings above, I myself cannot subscribe to the proposition in any significant sense. However, we are informed that the social sciences and the philosophy of culture "reveal" the difficulties in the way of world order to "center in considerable part in ideological differences" (p. iii); so the lack should perhaps be attributed, not to the book, but to my own ignorance of the latest deliverances of science and philosophy. And whether the obscurities lie in myself or elsewhere, the contents possess in themselves a high interest.

Otherwise the book is good—and is dedicated to Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, of "Moral Re- armament" fame. Let me, therefore, recommend, instead, another book published in the same season by the Yale University Press (but 424 pages for $4.50, and that in addition to index and preface): Northrop's symposium entitled Ideological Differences and World Order.

T. V. SMITH


This analysis of the theories of time of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Augustine is of importance and interest in two respects. In the first place, it presents a very clearly written interpretation of the four doctrines in question. For Plato, in the Timaeus, time is seen as a bond or bridge between eternity and sheer becoming, in that it involves both being and becoming and is both sensible and intelligible. There is ethical relevance in such a conception, for "it is by observing the universe and the laws embodied in it that man is enabled to lead a good life, and among the contributions made by the heavens to man is the notion of time." For Aristotle the problem of time is a problem of physics primarily, and time is investigated in a context of motion and change of which nature is the principle. In chapter iii, "Plotinus: Time, the Life of Soul," the author is able to show how this philosopher, employing conceptions derived from both of his predecessors, arrives at an original view which is quite distinct from both the Platonic and the Aristotelian. While for Plato time had a positive function with respect to morality, in Plotinus it is something which man must rise above in the attainment of moral perfection. Augustine's view, finally, while being similar to that of Plotinus on the point just mentioned, makes central the psychological standpoint which had been peripheral in the preceding analyses. Augustine is also shown to be in many ways similar to Aristotle in his solution of the problem of time.

Second, the present study is an example of what may be called "disciplinary history." Each philosopher's doctrine on time is treated in the philosopher's own terms, and the diversities and similarities are explained with reference to the
context, especially the methodological context, in which the attempt is made to solve the problem. As the author sums it up, "time, which was treated metaphorically by Plato as the moving image of eternity, physically by Aristotle as the number or measure of motion, and metaphysically by Plotinus as the productive life of soul, receives at the hands of St. Augustine a new facet, the psychological" (p. 204).

WILLIAM O'MEARA


Twenty-five years ago the distinguished Brazilian jurist, Clovis Bevilacqua, maintained that Kant had made no important converts among the more productive thinkers of Brazil. This thesis Miguel Reale, professor of the philosophy of law at the University of São Paulo, has undertaken to refute in the two essays here published together. From the 1840's on, he shows in the first essay, Kant had considerable influence, though sometimes vague and at second or third hand, on prominent Brazilian thinkers. It is interesting to know that this influence was mainly in philosophy of law—a fact, however, which is easily explained, since until recent times it was in jurisprudence that Brazilian philosophy mainly developed. The second essay is devoted to the senator of the early nineteenth-century empire and later regent, Father Diogo Antonio Feijó. Reale holds that Father Feijó "was the first to treat specifically of philosophical questions in Brazil" and points out that in the compendia he wrote, probably between 1818 and 1821 ("a sumula of Logic, some Preliminary Notions of Philosophy, and a compendium of Moral Philosophy"—unpublished, however, until 1921), Father Feijó preferred Kantianism to Aristotelianism. Incidentally, Father Feijó accepted Kantianism more fully in epistemology than in moral philosophy, though he attempted to reconcile it with the traditional rationalism of the period. These two essays add another little bit to the history of philosophy in our hemisphere—a study which has received increasing attention of late, not only in North America, but in the Ibero-American nations as well.

ARTHUR CHILD


This is the third, but not the last, of four or more volumes that are to cover, with reference to religion, English poetry from the eighteenth century. The first volume (1700–1740), entitled Protestantism and the Call of Sentiment, appeared in 1936; the second (1740–80), Religious Sentimentalism in the Age of Johnson, appeared in 1942. The fourth volume is tentatively promised for about 1955. Unlike the earlier volumes and those to come, this one concentrates upon a few major poets, notably, Burns, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Byron, and Keats. The author claims, and I believe with warrant, that this is the first book in which "a twentieth-century historical critic has treated the religion of all the major romantic poets in a single continuous discussion dominated by a unifying point of view." His "point of view," it may be noted, is that "romanticism...is essentially a religious experience." Religion is, however, more the fruit than the root of romanticism, as he has come to believe. The root of the matter he now regards as a faith "in the natural goodness, strength, and creativity of human energies." This spirit he finds exemplified in all the poets named. I have examined with care, as a proving ground, the chapter on Wordsworth and have found it, if not above dramatizing the obvious, complete in survey of data, replete with natural piety, and infused with high seriousness for the task at hand.

T. V. SMITH


This is another of the distinguished "Rivers of America" series, edited by Hervey Allen and Carl Carmer. The series now numbers about three dozens and has done much to revivify and to document the interest in our waterways. This, like the other volumes, tells the story of regional development around the river involved. It makes a focal point of dynamic symbolism and gives an ecological unity which hardly any other strategy could provide. Combined here with the natural Mohawk is the artificial Eric Canal and the mechanical corollary of that artificiality, the New York Central Railroad. The story of these is the history of upper New York State from earliest times to the present.
BOOK REVIEWS


This volume deserves the high praise that it is worthy of the distinguished scholar to whom it is dedicated. Mirroring in excellent fashion the chief intellectual interests to which Professor Sabine has devoted his pen, its contributions fall into two groups: (1) a series of twelve chronologically ordered discussions of topics in the history of political theory and (2) five papers on various aspects of the axiology and logic of political theory. The contributions as a whole maintain a high level of competence.

J. A. O. Larsen's "Cleisthenes and the Development of the Theory of Democracy at Athens" is a useful study, with sensitive philosophical grasp, of the employment and meaning of the word demokratia from Herodotus to Cleisthenes. It suggests important questions which have been crucial to much subsequent democratic theory, for it brings out the relation of demokratia to isonomia (equality) in contrast to the dominance of "the people or lower classes," a theme which became so prominent in Plato and Aristotle. Glenn R. Morrow's "Plato and the Law of Nature" is a valuable analysis of the Platonic origins of the Stoic doctrine of the law of nature as the law of right reason. It is fortunate that this question is finally receiving the careful attention it deserves. Francis D. Wormuth discusses "Aristotle on Law," arguing that Aristotle believed neither "in the inflexible application of positive law, to the disregard of meliorative considerations," nor "in a superior morality which nullified positive law." Max H. Fisch, the translator of Vico, presents a competent study of "Vico on Roman Law"; his sections on "written and unwritten law" (pp. 73-74) and on "Greek philosophy and Roman law" (pp. 84 ff.) contain interesting accompaniments to the two preceding papers. Arthur E. Murphy, in "Mr. Northrop and Mr. Locke," provides an acute refutation of Professor Northrop's by now familiar interpretation, in The Meeting of East and West, of Locke's political theory as being based on the identification of "the political person" with "an independent, atomic mental substance." Murphy's analysis appears to me to be very cogent not only in its immediate objective but also in its reflection on the general question of the deduction of political conclusions from more general ontological and epistemological premises. In "The Substance of the Social Contract" Bertram Morris reinterprets the contract as "both a historical reality and a principle of moral obligation" by stressing its relation to the basic values of the liberal tradition.

The six remaining historical papers are: "Man and Citizen: Applications of Individualism in the French Revolution," by R. R. Palmer; "From Compact to National State in American Political Thought," by Charles M. Witte; "Marx and Weitling," by Carl Witte; "John Morley on Liberty and Compromise," by Milton R. Konvitz; "The Vital Disequilibrium in Croce's Historicism," by Katharine Gilbert; and "The Political Typology of Mocler van den Bruck," by Albert R. Chandler. Lack of space prevents extensive comment on these essays, but they present interesting materials for comparison with the preceding studies. For example, Witte's interpretation of the social "compact" differs in important respects from Morris'; and the "individualism" discussed by Palmer and the "compromise" stressed by Konvitz, each involving an important facet of the democratic tradition, provide suggestive contrasts both to one another and to the isonomia which is basic in Larsen's discussion of Greek democracy.

Of the five nonhistorical essays, three deal with the bases of moral and political values:
Julius R. Weinberg, “On Sabine’s Philosophy of Value”; Frederick L. Will, “Values, Objectivity, and Democracy”; G. Watts Cunningham, “Reason, Morality, and Democracy.” All three papers depart, the first two with explicit mention, from Professor Sabine’s nonrationalist doctrine of value, and hence too from the currently fashionable emotive theory of ethical meaning. Finally, there are Henry Alonzo Myers’ essay on “Heroes and the Way of Compromise” and Robert E. Cushman on “‘Clear and Present Danger’ in Free Speech Cases: A Study in Judicial Semantics.”

ALAN GEWIRTH


Even more than in the case of Locke, Hume’s political philosophy has not received from commentators the detailed attention it deserves because of the overwhelming interest in his epistemological doctrines. Locke’s political ideas, as distinct from his systematic formulation of them in the second Treatise, have at least been persistently in the forefront of discussion because of their connection with the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; but Hume’s ideas, lacking such immediate associations with crucial events, have suffered from neglect equally as much as have his doctrinal expressions of them. For this reason, the volume under review is especially to be welcomed. It presents a full-scale study of the complete Humian political philosophy, with reference not only to Hume’s texts but also to most of the previous commentators and to Hume’s antecedents. Its scope can be indicated by citing the subject matters of the eight parts into which the book is divided: the psychological basis of law, legal obligation, Hume’s originality (in relation to Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Butler, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith), property, state and nation, political parties, politics as a science, and the function of reason in legal experience. Not all the author’s interpretations would be indorsed by this reviewer; moreover, despite Bagolini’s general familiarity with recent American and British commentators, there is no mention of such important discussions of Hume as that in Sabine’s History of Political Theory. Nevertheless, the book fills a long-felt need and does it well. It is strongly to be hoped that commentators writing in English will soon follow in the steps of this Italian scholar, and with comparable thoroughness and insight.

ALAN GEWirth


This book differs from the usual histories of legal theory in that it concerns itself “only with the conclusions reached by professional philosophers and not with what other perhaps equally gifted men in jurisprudence, such as Grotius, have done with their conclusions” (pp. ix-x). A chapter, averaging thirty-five to forty pages, is devoted to the legal doctrines of each of thirteen philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The principle of selection of these thirteen is not entirely clear. The Middle Ages suffer from their usual sparse treatment: one would have liked to see the inclusion of at least Augustine, John of Salisbury (whose Metallicum qualifies him as a “professional philosopher” and whose Policraticus contains important legal conceptions), and William of Ockham; while among the pre-Hegelian moderns the omission of Bentham is puzzling, unless it be that his main contribution was held to be post-Hegelian in its influence or that he was not a “professional philosopher.” (Was Bacon?)

Cairns has read widely in both primary and secondary sources, and his work provides useful summaries of the legal doctrines treated, locating them in each case within the general framework of the complete philosophy. To this extent, the book can be highly recommended for the factual information it contains. It does not, however, attempt any sustained comparisons of premises or even of conclusions, and it is insufficiently analytic in its treatment of basic concepts, such as in its seeming equation of Aristotle’s natural justice and Cicero’s natural law (p. 133; cf. p. 26).


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